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ABSTRACT
This thesis compares the outcome of three Boston neighborhood groups' efforts to
effectuate project changes to three specific large-scale development proposals in their
neighborhoods. Specifically, the experiences of Fight Liberty Place (FLP) in opposing
Liberty Place in Chinatown, Old Dover Neighborhood Association (ODNA) in shaping
Dover Residences in the South End, and the Battery Wharf Working Group (BWWG) in
affecting Battery Wharf in the North End were examined. A neighborhood's ability to
influence project changes was found to be a function of internal neighborhood unity in
and institutional support for the neighborhood. Institutional support is used to mean
support from city representatives who can exert influence in the development approval
process and make a concerted effort to work with a neighborhood to either implement
project changes or withhold approval of a project in response to neighborhood demands.
Based on the findings of the three cases, it has been surmised that changes in design and
off-site mitigation can be more easily secured than changes in dimensions, use, and
affordable housing. The experiences of the three neighborhood groups also highlight
tactical considerations that neighborhoods should bear in mind when proceeding with a
strategy against a development. In particular, neighborhood divisions not only prevent the
collective interests of the neighborhood from being addressed but can also enable the city
to put aside neighborhood interests in favor of maintaining the interests of the greater
public. In addition, the thrust of a neighborhood's effort to effectuate project changes
must be channeled through its advisory power to successfully convince and persuade the
Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) and developer. Furthermore, the level of
institutional support that a neighborhood group garners can fluctuate according to the
degree of neighborhood unity conveyed. Lastly, recommendations are presented to
inform Boston neighborhoods of ways in which they can strengthen their influence as
they continue to tackle large projects proposed in their boundaries.
Thesis Supervisor: Karl Seidman
Title: Senior Lecturer
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis was prompted by my past experience working with Boston Chinatown
residents on minimizing the effects of large-scale developments in their neighborhood. At
the time of my involvement, the rate of large-scale development being proposed and built
in and around the neighborhood's borders was rapidly rising while the supply of
developable land in the downtown was quickly diminishing. My more recent
communication with other downtown neighborhoods reveals that large-scale
developments have been occurring across nearly all neighborhoods. This pattern of
development has translated into an increased cost of living which threatens the ability of
working-class residents to live in their neighborhoods throughout downtown Boston'.
Consequently, the City of Boston has witnessed a resurgence in neighborhood action in
these areas as a result of the pattern of development.
Since the mid 1990s, the number of proposed large-scale developments relative to a
neighborhood's geographical area seems to be greatest in Chinatown, of all the
downtown neighborhoods. Since 1996 the neighborhood has been affected by seven
projects in and around an area of 61.8 acres2 . This means that one large-scale
development has been proposed for every 9 acres3 in Chinatown. Meanwhile, the North
End has been host to two projects in an area of 133.1 acres4 and the South End has had 15
projects in an area of 658.5 acres5. The geographical area to proposed development ratio
of the North End and South End, respectively, have been calculated to be approximately
67 and 44 acres per project.
In addition to the disparity in the concentration of development, Chinatown residents
seem to have had less influence in effectuating project changes compared to residents in
1 The term "neighborhood" is used in this thesis to signify a place-based community of residents and
organizations confined to a geographical area.
2 The area was calculated using GIS and according to Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) boundaries
and data. The area is bounded by Tremont Street, Marginal Road, the Southeast Expressway, and Essex
Street.
3 Area to development ratio came out to 8.8.
4 The area was calculated using GIS and according to BRA boundaries and data. The area is bounded by N.
Washington Street, the Southeast Expressway, the wharves extending from Atlantic Avenue and
Commercial Street.
5 The area was calculated using GIS and according to BRA boundaries and data. The area is bounded by the
Massachusetts Turnpike, the Southeast Expressway, Melnea Cass Boulevard, and the MBTA/Amtrak line.
6 The acreage to development ratio came out to 43.9 in the South End and 66.5 in the North End.
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other neighborhoods. While residents in the abutting Leather District decreased the height
of a project by 40% from its original 20-story proposed structure7 , Chinatown residents
struggle to get developers to build anywhere near the legal zoning envelope.
Research Questions
This thesis examines the role of neighborhood involvement in affecting private large-
scale developments in Boston downtown neighborhoods. A literature search of MIT's
planning library and databases reveal that no study of this type has been published. Yet
personal communication with a number of representatives from various Boston
neighborhoods reveal that many are struggling to effectuate changes so that proposed
projects are sensitive to the needs of the neighborhood and abide by legal zoning. While
neighborhood involvement in the development process can significantly change a
proposed project, it is unclear which tactics are most effective in influencing project
changes.
My proposal in this thesis is that the extent to which a neighborhood can effectuate
project changes is dependent on the influence it wields in the process. I believe this
influence, in turn, is a function of the level of unity in and institutional support extended
to the neighborhood. I examined the following research questions according to my
proposal above-described premise.
1. How have neighborhoods influenced large-scale development projects in downtown
Boston?
I identified three Boston neighborhoods that have been affected by large-scale
developments as case studies, and selected one project in each neighborhood as the focus
of each study. I assessed the cases according to the neighborhood's participation in the
development process, the demands made, and the project changes that subsequently
occurred.
2. Which tactics have been most effective in creating positive outcomes for the
neighborhood?
7 The project name is 2 Financial Place.
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I carried out a comparative analysis of project changes and outcomes in each
neighborhood to determine which neighborhoods were most successful in effectuating
project changes. I then identified and examined the tactics that led to these changes to
help inform other Boston neighborhoods who face similar development challenges.
Research Design
Based on Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) records of large-scale developments
8dating back to 1996 , I selected three projects in three neighborhoods as case studies. The
developments are Liberty Place in Chinatown, Dover Residences in the South End, and
Battery Wharf in the North End. The Chinatown development was the motivation for this
Downtown Boston Neighborhoods and Three Large-Scale Developments
Soure* 1otln RAmpd/of tAuthr*eI rn
Figure 1. A map of the three neighborhoods in downtown Boston.
8 The public documents room at the BRA houses records only since 1996. Records prior to that have been
archived and/or were destroyed in a flood at the Boston Public Library in 1998.
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thesis and the South End and North End projects were selected for characteristics that
they share with Chinatown. Figure 1 illustrates the location of the neighborhoods in
downtown Boston.
The South End was chosen for its location and the number of developments that have
been proposed in the neighborhood since 1996. The South End abuts Chinatown to the
south and is located on the other side of the Massachusetts Turnpike (1-90). BRA records
reveal that the South End has had the second highest number of development proposals 9
since 1996. The North End was selected for its cultural character, size, and history. Like
Chinatown, the North End is historically an immigrant and working-class neighborhood
in a small and dense land area. Both Chinatown and the North End have few developable
parcels of land remaining but have been inundated with capital large-scale projects such
as the Big Dig.
Methodology
Following the selection of neighborhoods, I arranged interviews with the BRA staff, the
developers, and neighborhood representatives. BRA planners for each neighborhood
were identified and interviewed to gain an overview of the development scheme in each
neighborhood. The BRA planners interviewed included Sue Kim for Chinatown, Randi
Lathrop for the South End, and Dick Garver for the North End. After the planners, I
interviewed neighborhood representatives, developers and BRA project managers
simultaneously. Three representatives from neighborhood groups involved with the
developments were contacted to understand the neighborhood's role in the development
process and the tactics used to effectuate project changes. The neighborhood
representatives were selected according to conversations with the BRA planners.
I also carried out interviews with specific project managers. However, the project
managers for the North End developments were no longer at the BRA and could not be
interviewed. To compensate for the absence of BRA input, consistent accounts given by
neighborhood representatives and the developers of BRA actions were extrapolated and
discussed.
9 The Fenway has had the highest number of large-scale projects proposed in its boundaries.
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The three developments were selected based on conversations with the BRA planners and
neighborhood representatives. It was apparent that certain developments had a greater
impact on the residents than others. Projects consisting of private-nonprofit development
teams were eliminated to maintain consistency between the three neighborhoods, as the
North End did not have such a project.
Chinatown's Liberty Place was selected because it is located right in the commercial
sector of the neighborhood and the neighborhood was quite active around the
development. The South End's Dover Residences was selected based on an interview
with Maria Faria of the BRA. Faria had managed several large-scale projects in the South
End over the years and identified Dover Residences as a development which intensely
involved the city, neighborhood, and developer. The North End's Battery Wharf was
selected because it was one of two large projects proposed in the neighborhood and is
located right in the North End rather than along its border. In addition, the North End
neighborhood was distinctly more active around the Battery Wharf project than around
the other proposed development. The developers for the chosen projects include Kevin
Fitzgerald for Liberty Place, Demetrios Dasco for Dover Residences, and Jim English
and Harold Theran for Battery Wharf.
In the interest of maintaining consistency, I determined the neighborhood demands
denoted in each case study from letters drafted by each neighborhood group during the
project comment periods. Consequently, not all demands may be represented in the cases
and demands made in other arenas such as through newspaper articles, letters to the
editor or at public meetings have not been captured in this thesis. Similarly, the project
changes described in the case studies were drawn from a combination of two specific
documents, the cooperation agreement and the BRA Board Memorandum seeking final
project approval. When there were inconsistencies in the terms of project approval, the
terms described in the cooperation agreement were selected because the cooperation
agreement is legally binding and serves as the final mitigation plan for a project.
However, it is important to note that not all terms described in the cooperation agreement
and BRA Board Memorandums are reflected in this thesis. Terms that fell outside the
parameters of project use, dimensions, design, affordable housing, and off-site mitigation
such as construction schedules and exaction payments were not included in this thesis. In
13
addition, I made a request for the cooperation agreement of Liberty Place at the BRA but
the agency could not locate the document. This may yield some discrepancy in the final
project changes described in the Liberty Place case.
Thesis Organization
Chapter Two provides an overview of the large-scale development approval process in
the City of Boston and the regulations that govern a project site. In addition, it includes a
discussion of the means of neighborhood involvement, underlying issues with
neighborhood involvement and the development process, and criteria for evaluating
project outcomes. Chapter Three introduces the first case study, Chinatown. The Liberty
Place project is described in the context of the neighborhood. In addition, the chapter
includes an assessment of the neighborhood's involvement in the process, tactics used,
project changes and outcomes. Chapters Four and Five follow the same format as Chapter
Three except they cover the South End and North End, respectively. Chapter Six involves
a comparative analysis of the project changes and tactics used to effectuate the changes in
projects. Chapter Seven concludes with a summary of how neighborhood participation
has affected the development of large projects in Boston. Recommendations are also
proposed to inform other Boston neighborhoods of ways they can be more effective in
influencing project changes.
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Chapter 2: Neighborhood Involvement in Large-Scale Project
Approvals
Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the backdrop for how Boston neighborhoods are
involved in the approval of large-scale developments. First the "process" and means in
which a neighborhood can participate in the process are explained to point out ways in
which a neighborhood can secure institutional support to make project changes. Second,
the issues that underlie a neighborhood's ability to effectuate project changes are
discussed. Third, criteria for neighborhood success are identified. These criteria will be
applied in Chapter 6 to evaluate the outcome of each case study and bring out lessons that
can be gleaned from the cases.
The Process and Neighborhood Involvement
This thesis defines "process" to be government administration of large-scale development
approval and "institutional support" as the support of city representatives who are both
involved in Boston's development approval process and make efforts to implement
neighborhood demands for project changes. The terms are more clearly defined later in
this chapter when means of neighborhood involvement in the process are discussed. The
"process" is briefly illustrated in Diagram 1 and primarily encompasses the city's large
project public review process (Article 80), the state environmental review process, the
city's zoning system, and any additional applicable regulatory mechanisms, such as
Chapter 9110 or Landmarks Commission 1 approval. The process is the formal
institutional structure through which neighborhoods can affect a project.
10 Under the state's "public trust doctrine" the project must provide public accommodation for anyone
accessing the water if a project is in contact with or close proximity to Massachusetts waterways and
tidelands.
"1 If a project is located in a historically protected Boston neighborhood, final project approval is contingent
on approval by the Landmarks Commission.
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Diagram 1. General overview of the large-scale development approval process in Boston.
Boston Large Project Public Review Process
Article 80 is the city's development review and approval process and the essential arena
in which neighborhoods can participate in the large project approval process and push for
project changes. The components of the review include transportation, environmental
protection, urban design, historic resources, infrastructure systems, site plan, tidelands
and development impact exactions. Given the project information provided,
neighborhoods can use all opportunities in the process for public comment to build a case
against a project or for changes to it. Diagram 2 outlines the general procedure for Article
80. To affect change, neighborhoods can participate in an Impact Advisory Group (IAGs),
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submit comments and testify during public review, and prolong the review process by
appealing to the developer and/or city.
An IAG is a 9-member group representing neighborhood residents, businesses, and
community organizations such as neighborhood council members. Instituted in October
2000, IAGs were added to the Article 80 process as a way to directly involve the
neighborhood in working with the city and developer in determining an appropriate
mitigation and community benefits13 package from the developer. IAGs are selected on
a project-by-project basis and appointed by the mayor and local elected officials
representing the impacted neighborhood(s). An IAG enables neighborhood
representatives to be influential in getting their demands met. However, by virtue of
focusing the discussion on benefits and mitigation, it is assumed that IAG members want
the project to happen and are willing to negotiate what terms would adequately offset the
negative impacts from the project.
There are several points, illustrated in Diagram 2, at which neighborhoods can submit
testimonies and written comments about a project. This provides opportunities for
neighborhoods to make their demands known to the BRA and build support at the city
level, with political allies, with groups outside the neighborhood and within the
neighborhood. If the neighborhood feels that the process, BRA, and developer are not
being responsive to their concerns, it can opt to prolong the process through a number of
tactics, from increasing media attention about the lack of concern for neighborhood
demands during the process to simply requesting extension of comment periods.
12 Mitigation generally refers to improvements that a developer provides to offset the environmental
damages that a project causes in the surrounding area. Mitigation could include outfitting an abutting
building with thicker windows to minimize the noise and air pollution from the implementation of a large
freeway or providing funds for an independent air pollution study to determine the cumulative impacts of
traffic in the area.
13 Community benefits refer to additional resources provided by the developer that do not directly respond
to the environmental damages caused by a project. For example, a developer may provide monies for child
care facilities or a community center in a neighborhood because its residents have identified a dire need for
such facilities. For the purposes of this thesis, off-site mitigation may include both mitigation and
community benefits.
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Article 80 Large Project Review
Step 1: Letter of Intent (LOI) and IAG selection
Applicant submits an
LOI. H--The mayor andneighborhood electedofficial appoint a 9-
member JAG.
Step 2: Project Notification Form (PNF) and Scoping Determination
Applicant files DPIR in Public comment period BRA issues Scoping
response to Scoping runs for 30, 45 or 75 days Determination within 45
Determ. Notice of after DPIR filed, days after PNF filed.
DPIR published within depending on project size
5 days. and location.
The Scoping Determination may waive further review, and require mitigation commitments, if the
BRA Board finds that the PNF and public comments provide adequate information about the project's
impacts.
Step 3: Draft Project Impact Report (DPIR) and Preliminary Adequacy Determination (PAD)
Applicant files PNF. Public comment period
Notice of PNF runs for 30 days after
published within 5 days. notice published. H0
BRA issues PAD within 45,
60 or 90 days after DPIR
filed, depending on project
size and location.
The PAD may waive further review, and require mitigation commitments, if the BRA Board finds that the
DPIR and public comments provide adequate information about the project's impacts.
Step 4: Final Project Impact Report (FPIR) and Adequacy Determination
The PAD may waive further review, and require mitigation commitments, if the BRA Board finds that
the DPIR and public comments provide adequate information about the project's impacts.
Note: "Applicant" refers to the Developer of the proposed project.
Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority with inclusion of IAG in Step 1.
Diagram 2. A general outline of Boston's Article 80 process.
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Applicant files FPIR in
response to PAD.
Notice of FPIR
published within 5 days.
Public comment period
runs for 30, 45 or 75 days
after FPIR filed, depending
on project size and location.
BRA Board holds public meeting
and votes on Adequacy
Determination within 45, 60 or 90
days after FPIR filed, depending
on project size and location.
State Environmental Approval Process
The Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Review1 (MiEPA Review) process can be
a vehicle for project changes in that it can provide environmental justifications for
neighborhood demands. Neighborhoods can leverage their position through public
comments and testimonies like that in Article 80. MEPA occurs in parallel to Article 80
and is required of all large projects . In practice, BRA staff have often worked with the
developer to fulfill MEPA requirements. Even so, a neighborhood can use MEPA in
combination with Article 80 to build a public campaign that brings to the surface
neighborhood concerns and demands of a project. For the purposes of this thesis, less
attention is paid to MiEPA and more is focused on the city's Article 80 process.
Zoning 1
Zoning can provide legal grounds for a neighborhood to challenge a project because it is
a legal mechanism that the city must uphold and places restrictions on land use to protect
17
the interests of the public . Zoning can be a leverage point if a project is in gross
violation of zoning and the neighborhood feels it is not being heard by the city or
developer. In fact, the degree that project uses and dimensions deviate from the zoning
can determine how aggressively a neighborhood participates in the process to push for
project changes.
Generally, large-scale projects require zoning exceptions because of their scope and use.
Table 1 outlines proposed height and floor area ratios (FAR) for large projects relative to
181 20
the zoning limits for Chinatown i, the South End19, and the North End , to demonstrate
14 MEPA assists government agencies to use all feasible means to avoid environmental damage or to
minimize and mitigate damage to the maximum extent possible of development proposals. For more
information: http://www.state.ma.us/envir/mepa/thirdlevelpages/meparegulations/ 3 01cmr1101.htm.
15 MEPA approval involves either undergoing the MEPA review process or receiving a MEPA waiver from
further review. The MEPA review allows the public to review potential environmental impacts of large-
scale developments and voice concerns through public comments and at public meetings.
16 Taxpayers Association of Weymouth Tp., Inc. v Wesymouth Tp. (NJ, 1976). The intent of zoning is to
balance market forces with the public good. If the public good can be well served by a project that does not
conform to zoning, exceptions may be granted. Zoning exceptions are intended to protect the value of a
private property owner's land. Owners must demonstrate "hardship" as defined under state zoning law and
show that s/he will lose significant value of land if a zoning exception is not granted.
17 Euclid v Ambler (US, 1926), Bow and Arrow Manor v. West Orange (NJ, 1973)
18 Article 43 and the Midtown Cultural District of the Boston Zoning Code.
19 Article 64 of the Boston Zoning Code.2 0 Article 54 of the Boston Zoning Code.
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Proposed Project Details for Large-Scale Developments in
Three Boston Neighborhoods
Chinatown South End North End
Project Name Liberty Place Dover Residences Battery Wharf
Area of Lot 46,363 47,780 199,800
Total Floor Area of
Project 650,341 199,940 *341,300
Height (ft) 310 80 **54
Floor Area Ratio (FAR) 11 4 2
*Excludes parking
**Height does not include 16-foot pitched roof which increased total
height to 70 ft.
Table 1. Proposed project details as described in the Project Notification Forms (PNF) and zoning
restrictions under the Boston Zoning Code.
how projects can conform or deviate from the allowable zoning. For example, height was
proposed at over three times the zoned limit in the case of Liberty Place , but just 14%
and 10 feet above the height limit in the case of Dover Residences. With respect to FAR",
projects can be proposed below the zoning limit, as in the case of Battery Wharf, or close
to 50% above the legal limit, as in the case of Chinatown. In addition, conditional use
permits are sometimes sought for a project. In the South End's Washington Street
Neighborhood Development Area and the North End's Neighborhood Shopping
Subdistricts, residential housing with ground-floor commercial use were emphasized in
the zoning. To build a different type of project, such as five-star hotel, a developer would
need a zoning change in allowable uses on a site or in a neighborhood area.
In Boston, the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) and Zoning Commission (ZC) grant
changes to zoning. The ZBA grants variances and conditional use permits for private
21 Floor Area Ratio (FAR) is a ratio that limits floor area as a proportion of lot area.
22In order to gain variances, the applicant must show hardship under the state enabling act. Variances can
be dimensional and conditional use changes. According to the Massachusetts State Enabling Act (Article 7,
Section 7.3), the Boston Zoning Board of Appeal shall grant a variance when all four of the following
conditions are met. A) Special circumstances or conditions peculiar to the land but not the neighborhood
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property while the Zoning Commission issues modifications to the zoning code23. The
BRA staffs both the ZBA and Zoning Commission and the mayor appoints all persons on
the two zoning bodies as well as four out of the five members of the BRA board and the
BRA director. When the BRA Board of Directors issues final approval for a project, it
explicitly endorses any zoning changes needed to realize the project. Put another way, the
ZBA and Zoning Commission do not hear a case until the BRA Board of Directors or
BRA staff reviews the application for zoning changes and makes a recommendation. The
ZBA and Zoning Commission hold public hearings and makes zoning decisions on a
case-by-case basis. That is, both bodies are not legally bound to use past decisions to
inform present cases.
The hearings provide a public forum for neighborhoods to testify and formally express
their concerns. In this respect, the hearings serve as yet another pressure point which
neighborhoods can push to demand project changes. Even so, zoning in Boston is a
dilemma for neighborhoods. Under the state enabling act, the BRA is the authority that
enforces zoning yet in practice the BRA appears to enforce zoning on a discretionary
basis. Downtown neighborhoods have demanded with little success that the BRA use
zoning as the basis for development and require proposed projects to adhere to the zoning.
The BRA instead allows projects to be proposed beyond the allowable limits as
illustrated in Table 1 and determines which and when a project can seek zoning changes.
Under this structure, neighborhoods are almost forced to gather support from the BRA
and, ideally, the mayor to ensure that project changes occur.
that would deprive the appellant of reasonable use of land or structure. B) Variance sought is necessary for
the reasonable use of land or structure and the minimum variance necessary to accomplish this purpose. C)
Granting of variance will be in harmony with general purpose and intent of Boston zoning code and not
injurious to the neighborhood or detrimental to public welfare. D) If variance is for a Development Impact
Project (Section 80B-7), the applicant has complied with such requirements.
23 Zoning modifications occur as either zoning map or text amendments, though map amendments are more
often made. The laws governing the Boston Zoning Commission does not set a limit for the number of
times a developer can request zoning modification for a particular site. Though, in practice, the commission
follows an informal 3-strikes rule in which a developer has up to three attempts to obtain the necessary
amendment to his/her project. After the third attempt, the Zoning Commission may decide not to hear the
case again. The development of BRA-owned urban renewal parcels are often reviewed before the Zoning
Commission. These parcels qualify for an Urban Renewal District (U-District) designation which overrides
existing zoning to allow larger scale projects to be built.
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Other Regulatory Mechanisms
In Boston, Chapter 912 and the Landmarks Commission are other regulatory
mechanisms that may apply to a site. "Chapter 91 authorization is required for structures
in tidelands.. .piers, wharves, floats, retaining walls, revetments, pilings, bridges, dams
and some waterfront buildings (if on filled lands or over water)25". The regulations
determine setbacks from the water's edge, building height, and minimum open space
allocation. This provides a legal avenue for neighborhoods to challenge a project
proposal if it does not meet the development regulations set by the law. In this respect
Chapter 91 allows neighborhoods to hold a developer accountable to specific dimensional
and use standards of a project through the state's Executive Office of Environmental
Affairs (EOEA) which neither Article 80 nor MEPA do.
The Boston Landmarks Commission2 6 serves as yet another checkpoint that a developer
must pass to gain final approval if the project is located in a historic neighborhood or
designated as a historic property. The commission "...performs many functions. These
include identifying and preserving historic properties, reviewing development and
demolition activities proposed in the city...."27 Founded to carry out historical
preservation, the Landmarks Commission can be a potential ally for neighborhoods in
that it works to maintain the architectural fabric of neighborhoods. Therefore, the
commission is less inclined to approve a large project that upsets the physical scale of a
neighborhood than the city would.
24 Chapter 91 includes specific rules that ensure that development on the land at water's edge is for a
"proper public purpose." The law allows local government to change the development rules by creating a
Municipal Harbor Plan approved by the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA). The City of
Boston has a Municipal Harbor Plan which applies to its waterfront.
25 http://www.state.ma.us/dep/brp/waterway/faqs.htm
26 The Boston Landmarks Commission was created in 1975 under state legislation (Chapter 772,
M.G.L. 1975 as amended) to be Boston's city-wide historic preservation agency. It performs many
functions which include determining and preserving historic properties, reviewing development
and demolition activities in the city, distributing public information and assistance on
preservation practices, and providing support to local historic district commissions. The BLC also
administers Article 85 of the Zoning Code, the City's Demolition Delay process.27 http://www.cityofboston.gov/environment/landmarks.asp
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Means of Neighborhood Involvement in the Process
Involvement in the process is a direct method of getting the city's attention and
potentially garnering support from the city which is fundamental to ensuring project
changes. For the purposes of this thesis, institutional support is a core concept and
generally used to mean support from city representatives who can exert influence on the
development approval process and make a concerted effort to work with a neighborhood
to either implement project changes or withhold approval of a project in response to
neighborhood demands. A review of the "process" indicates that the mayor has a heavy
hand in the process by appointing key figures involved in development approval. The
figures range from the BRA director and BRA Board of Directors to the members of the
ZBA and Zoning Commission to IAG members. This suggests that securing support from
the mayor would be the ultimate form of institutional support in advancing neighborhood
concerns.
However, support from the mayor is not the only form of institutional support. The BRA
director can be instrumental in advancing neighborhood demands by appealing for
changes to the mayor and/or developer. BRA staff can push for changes and compel the
BRA director to look into a project more carefully. If a neighborhood can secure majority
support from the ZBA or ZC, the majority can deny an application for zoning changes
and recommend that the developer better address neighborhood concerns before returning
with another request for zoning change. This concept of withholding project support also
applies to the Boston Landmarks Commission and Boston Civic Design Commission28
(BCDC) which are both housed in the City of Boston. While this thesis focuses on
institutional support at the city level, it is important to note that withholding support at
the state level with the EOEA, which administers MEPA and Chapter 91, can be effective
if a project site requires such approvals. Neighborhoods have in fact focused on state
approvals over the city as a strategy to effect project changes.
There are three ways in which a neighborhood can participate in the process to get the
city's attention. First, a neighborhood can use the process to challenge a project and hold
both the developer and the city responsible for the impacts of the proposed project.
28Final project approval is subject to BCDC final design approval and landmarks commission approval if
the project is in the jurisdiction of the commission.
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Second, a neighborhood can work collaboratively with a developer to create a project that
the city will consider for approval. Third, a neighborhood can intervene in the process
and attempt to stop a project. This last action compels both the city and developer to
respond because the economic feasibility of a project is compromised by the intervention.
Underlying Issues with the Process and Neighborhood Involvement
The Process
In Boston, the influence that a neighborhood has in affecting a large-scale 29 project is
strongly associated with the degree of institutional support a neighborhood has. Article
80 stipulates that the BRA is required to administer public reviews and "... reviews a
project or plan in an advisory capacity only," (Section 80-2. Scope of this Article).
However, the BRA is also the authority that recommends zoning changes to the ZBA and
zoning commission, determines the appropriateness of a project proposal, influences
when a developer should enter Article 80, facilitates the MIEPA process, affects which
public comments to incorporate in a project, if any, and issues final approval of a project.
In this respect, the BRA is the force behind project changes and neighborhoods have little
direct influence except as members of an IAG.
IAGs however speak only to the issue of mitigation and community benefits provided by
the developer for a project. This implies that concerned members of the neighborhood
can exercise greater leverage in getting neighborhood demands met if they are part of an
IAG. However, it is assumed that people who serve on an IAG support the project.
Therefore, members of a neighborhood that wholly oppose a project would be hard-
pressed to join an IAG if they were invited. The influence of an IAG also varies project-
by-project and depends on a number of factors. In some neighborhoods, like the South
End, neighborhood associations wield more influence in affecting a project than an IAG.
In other neighborhoods, an IAG may not fairly represent a neighborhood because it omits
29 This thesis is primarily concerned with large-scale defined under Section 80B-2 subsections C and E of
the Boston Zoning Code. That is, the proposed project must "...establish or change the uses of a gross floor
area of one hundred thousand (100,000) or more square feet" or "...substantially rehabilitate a building or
structure having, or to have after rehabilitation, a gross floor area of more than one hundred thousand(100,000) square feet. When either of the two criteria holds, the projects are required to undergo the city's
Article 80 Large Project Review. The case studies selected for this thesis were drawn from city records of
private developments that have undergone Article 80 Large Project Review and whose primary use is not
affordable housing.
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a sector of the neighborhood that would be heavily impacted by the project but may have
strained relations with the BRA and mayor or because the composition of the IAG allows
one sector to have a greater impact determining mitigation and benefits. These issues
suggest that while IAGs attempt to give neighborhoods more influence in the
development review process, they do not necessarily provide an adequate voice for
neighborhoods because they are subject to political constraints between the mayor, BRA
and different sectors of a neighborhood.
Given the above, it is interesting that the stated purpose of Article 80 is "... to provide
clear, predictable, and unified requirements for the review of development projects
throughout the City. These review requirements also provide important opportunities for
community involvement in development review activities that affect the quality of life in
the City," (Section 80-2. Purpose of this Article). Yet personal communication with
numerous neighborhood groups and reviews of testimonies at public hearings reveal that
Boston neighborhoods feel they must fight to get the attention of the BRA and/or mayor
and compel them to incorporate neighborhood demands into a project. Otherwise, a
neighborhood must appeal to delay the process until neighborhood demands are
adequately addressed. This suggests that aggressive tactics in the Article 80 process are
more effective than a cooperative approach.
The Neighborhood
Neighborhood organization and internal conflicts between neighborhood groups naturally
shape the effectiveness with which a neighborhood makes project changes.
Neighborhood divisions prevent unity and provide opportunities for the city and
developers to further divide a neighborhood. Developers can attempt to win over one
sector of a neighborhood by offering select benefits specific to that sector. The city can
justify unfavorable project decisions by pointing to the lack of neighborhood unity which
put the city in a position of balancing the different interests. Also, the question of who
represents the neighborhood arises with no clear resolution.
In conjunction with using the process, neighborhood councils are another vehicle for
influencing project changes. Instituted during the Flynn administration (1983-1990),
neighborhood councils mainly serve as advisory bodies to the city and were created to
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give neighborhoods formal input in growth issues such as the delivery of city services,
licensing, and regulations 30 . Under the Boston zoning code, a neighborhood council 3 1 is
defined as "any neighborhood-based council established by the Mayor to render advice to
neighborhood residents, the Mayor, city departments, and the Boston Redevelopment
Authority regarding any municipal issues of neighborhood concern." While the city is not
obligated to abide by the councils' decisions, a comparison of neighborhood council
decisions on large developments and the city's development decisions reveal a positive
association between the two.
Neighborhood councils have been a point of contention in certain Boston neighborhoods.
The original council members were appointed by Mayor Flynn and each council created
bylaws unique to its neighborhood. Since Flynn's appointments, neighborhoods have
elected succeeding council members according to the bylaws of the neighborhood council.
For example, the North End Neighborhood Council bylaws stipulate that all its council
members must be North End residents, while in Chinatown, only 5 of its 21-member
council are reserved for residents while the remaining seats are allocated for businesses,
organizations, and others. In addition, the North End Neighborhood Council allows only
residents to vote in their elections, while any person of Asian descent living in the state of
Massachusetts as well as all Chinatown residents are allowed to vote in the Chinatown
Neighborhood Council elections. In Chinatown, the council bylaws have essentially
allowed business interests to dominate council decisions. Observations of the 1998
neighborhood council election reveal business leaders, such as out-of-town restaurant
owners, transporting their employees to the election site and indicating to their employees
for which candidates to vote. This practice illustrates how outside interests can dominate
resident interests in a neighborhood and create deep divisions around development.
In Chinatown and the North End, resident associations have been created to counter
neighborhood councils because there is enough of a consensus among residents that the
councils do not adequately represent the neighborhood(s). Considered local institutions
by the city, neighborhood councils have played a central role in the development
30 Liu, Michael. 1999. Chinatown's Urban Mobilization and Urban Development in Boston. PhD
Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Boston, p. 98.
3 Article 33 Open Space Subdistricts (Article inserted on March 8, 1988)
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approval process. They have reviewed projects that impact the neighborhood, worked
with developers to determine appropriate mitigation and benefits for the neighborhood,
and passed on their support or opposition to projects. Politics within the councils and
neighborhoods have led to divisions in the neighborhoods. In the case of the North End, a
former neighborhood council member became an elected city councilor. Ties such as
those in the North End have caused residents to question the underlying development
interests of the neighborhood council and whether it serves as a veiled pro-development
body for the city. Since the creation of IAGs, the mayor has selected council members to
serve on IAGs, which can further complicate the dynamics between the neighborhood
council and those suspicious of the council because some council members can have
greater input in the outcome of a project by asserting their voices in two formal
mechanisms of the development approval process rather than just one.
Fundamentally, neighborhoods become divided according to two conflicting perspectives
on how development should occur. Some neighborhood members prioritize project
design over community benefits and mitigation, while other members may perceive
community benefits for the neighborhood to be the priority. These two perspectives have
prevented neighborhood unity in many cases and complicated development matters in
determining appropriate compensation for a large development project.
The issues underlying the "process" and neighborhood organization present two levels of
challenges for a neighborhood to effectively shape large development projects. First,
neighborhood unity is a necessary component to facilitating core project changes.
Otherwise, the BRA and/or developer can freely determine the outcome of a proposal and
justify the final project as an attempt to address the conflicting interests of the
neighborhood. Second, the "process" does not give neighborhoods consistent regulations
A review of developments that have undergone Article 80 and conversations with a
number of BRA project managers and planners confirm that a project will likely gain
BRA board approval once it has entered the public review but will undergo design
change during the process. This statement reiterates that neighborhoods can influence
project changes and a project's outcome may be a function of how the neighborhood
approaches and uses the process. Since there are no consistent standards for approval and
zoning is selectively enforced, most approvals for project construction hinge on the BRA
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and the mayor. As a result, neighborhoods are almost forced to secure institutional
support in order for their demands to be adopted into a project.
Criteria for Evaluating Project Outcomes
In addressing the question of what tactics neighborhoods can use to effect changes to
large projects, this thesis operates under the assumption that there is no single solution or
approach. Instead, project-related changes, neighborhood unity and tactics in the case
studies are comparatively analyzed to draw lessons on what neighborhoods can do and
identify tactics that have contributed to large project changes. However, in order to fully
identify effective tactics and approaches, it is necessary to evaluate the extent to which
neighborhoods were able to secure desired project changes.
Public comments for large projects that have been submitted to the BRA reveal that
neighborhood demands largely revolve around five factors. Listed below, these factors
serve as the evaluation criteria in assessing a neighborhood's effectiveness in realizing
project changes. Evaluation is based on how changes to a project from the initial proposal
to the final design approved by the BRA and other regulatory bodies compare to the
project changes demanded by the surrounding neighborhood. The actual project changes
are then measured against the demands to assess the extent to which each neighborhood
was able to influence the outcome of a project for the following five criteria:
1. Project Use - proposed uses of the project (e.g. residential, commercial, retail,
etc.).
2. Project Dimensions - height, density, massing, and setbacks of the project.
3. Project Design - layout and building plan of the project, including building
materials, wall angles, etc.
4. Affordable Housing Allocation - housing units for people who make at or
below 120% of the Area Median Income (AMI).
5. Off-site Mitigation - improvements or contributions that occur off the project
site such as traffic signals, street improvements, contributions towards child
care, or contributions towards off-site affordable housing.
Project changes that occur in each of the five areas are identified in each case study.
Based on the project changes, neighborhood victories and failures of the project are
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determined and key tactics that contributed to the changes are identified. The tactics are
then examined according to their role in the process and their influence in securing
institutional support to meet neighborhood demands.
Based on the combined experiences of all three neighborhoods, lessons are gleaned
regarding what tactics proved to be more effective in ensuring project changes. In
addition, obstacles in the process and neighborhoods are discussed to acknowledge the
constraints of neighborhood tactics and bring to the surface other key issues that affect
the outcome of a large project. In the end, the effective tactics of each neighborhood are
extracted from the analysis and serve to inform other neighborhoods faced with similar
issues in Boston. Ultimately, the findings and conclusions of this thesis can fuel future
research in shaping an effective development approval process that enables
neighborhoods to influence large project proposals in a more cooperative setting with the
city.
The following three chapters involve case studies of one large development in each of
three neighborhoods, Chinatown, the South End, and the North End. In each case study,
the framework of this chapter is applied to assess the effectiveness of neighborhood
involvement in affecting project changes to a large development proposal.
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Chapter 3: Liberty Place
The Chinatown Neighborhood
Chinatown is a historically immigrant and working-class neighborhood of approximately
6000 residents 32 . Nearly 81% of the population identify themselves as Asian 33 and a high
percentage of the Chinatown population do not speak English well. According to the
1990 Census, 35.2 percent of respondents 5 years and older spoke English "not well" or
"not at all" and a small minority of Chinatown's Asian adult population are college
graduates 34 . The neighborhood is dense with a ratio of over 9000 residents to one acre of
35
open space
Chinatown's development history reveals that the neighborhood is just one-third its
original size36 . Chinatown has produced two master plans, the 1990 Chinatown
Community Plan and Chinatown Masterplan 2000, to guide growth and development in
the neighborhood. Development-related decisions have been influenced by the
Chinatown Neighborhood Council (CNC) since the late 1980s. The CNC is the only body
that holds a formal advisory role to the city3 7 . However, the barriers 38 that prevent
resident leadership in the council led to the formation of the Chinatown Resident
Association (CRA)39 in 1999. Both the CNC and CRA are concerned with Chinatown
development but hold opposing views on how it should be done.
32 Institute of Asian American Studies report based on Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF1) 100-Percent
Data.
33 Ibid.
34 Chinatown's 1990 Community Plan.
3 Chinatown's 1990 and 2000 master plans.
36 Construction of the Central Artery in the 1950s and Mass Pike in the 1960s reduced Chinatown's land
mass to 1/3 of its original size. At the same time housing was razed and taken by eminent domain as part of
Boston's urban renewal program. In the 1970s, the City rezoned a portion of the neighborhood for adult
entertainment and the Combat Zone moved from Scollay Square (Government Center) to Chinatown. In the
1980s Tufts University and New England Medical Center purchased much of the "blighted" land from the
City and expanded their facilities.
37 This was true until the Liberty Place project was approved and a legal settlement was reached with the
city.
38 According to CNC bylaws, only 5 resident seats exist on the 21-member council. In addition, any
Chinatown resident and person of Asian descent living in the state of Massachusetts is qualified to vote in
the CNC elections. This structure, though democratically carried out, gives residents a minority voice in the
development of their neighborhood.
39 The CRA is the only wholly resident group that represents people from all neighborhood blocks. The
majority of CRA are elderly and are committed to recruiting non-elderly Chinatown residents.
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CNC decisions on development in the neighborhood confirm that the CNC approaches
proposals with a special emphasis on mitigation and community benefits offered by the
developer 40. In contrast, the CRA41 was organized around development and its members
approach project proposals by assessing project impacts and reducing the negative effects.
Other neighborhood organizations that have been involved in the development of
Chinatown include but are not limited to the Chinese Progressive Association (CPA), the
Campaign to Protect Chinatown (CPC)42, the Boston Chinatown Neighborhood Center
(BCNC), Boston Chinese Evangelical Church (BCEC), and the Asian Community
Development Corporation (ACDC). The Chinatown Coalition (TCC) has played a
noteworthy role in securing the funding for the 2000 Chinatown Masterplan, an update of
the 1990 Community Plan. In addition, TCC represents a broad coalition of organizations
across Chinatown.
Project Description
Liberty Place was first proposed as a mixed office and hotel development of over
400,000 square feet 43 and approximately 30 stories which the developer, Kevin F.
Fitzgerald of 1025 Hancock, Inc., submitted for public review on June 15, 1999. The next
month, the project was introduced at a Chinatown Neighborhood Council meeting. The
Fitzgerald family had owned the site for generations and acquired abutting parcels over
the years to develop Liberty Place 44 . Fitzgerald states that the main goal of Liberty Place
40 Interview with Richard Chin of CNC on July 2, 2002. Chin has been on the CNC for 15 years.
41 With a growing prominence in Chinatown, the CRA has created difficult solutions by relaying unclear
and conflicting demands of a project. Both the city and members of the neighborhood recognize that the
CRA needs some time to iron out its internal organization.
42 The Campaign to Protect Chinatown was a collaborative project of the Chinese Progressive Association,
the Harry H. Dow Legal Assistance Fund, and the Asian American Resource Workshop. In 2002, the
Campaign to Protect Chinatown was subsumed into the Chinese Progressive Association.
43 According to the PNF for Liberty Place, the project would be 428,200 SF and stand at a height of 310
feet and an FAR at 11.
44 It is important to note that a main part of Fitzgerald's motivation to develop the site was to expand his
business holdings with minimal risk. Fitzgerald is in the parking business and was looking for a
development partner to incorporate a large parking garage into a project on the site. Arrangements were
made in which Fitzgerald would sell the project site to his partner contingent upon securing the necessary
approvals for the project. Once approved the development partner would be responsible for the entire
project during construction. Upon project completion, Fitzgerald would buy out the parking garage from
the partner and operate it independent from the rest of the project.
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was to diminish adult entertainment in the area45. Appendix A provides a timeline of
major events that occurred during the approval process of Liberty Place.
The site is 46,363 square feet and bounded by Washington, Beach,
Figure 2. The Liberty Place project in relation to the Chinatown
neighborhood.
Lok House. Figure 2 illustrates where Liberty Place is located in the
neighborhood46.
Harrison and Essex
Streets. Adult
entertainment is
permitted on the site
and abutting uses
include the
Massachusetts
Registry of Motor
Vehicles, a multi-
level parking garage,
a local supermarket,
a union-owned
commercial
building and an
elderly housing
project called Hong
Chinatown
The site is governed by Article 38 (Midtown Cultural District) and 43 (Chinatown
District) of the Boston Zoning code. The majority of the site falls under the commercial
subdistrict of Article 4347 where the height limitation is 100 feet and maximum floor area
ratio (FAR) is 7. Article 43 recognizes the 1990 Chinatown Community Plan as the
general plan for development in the area and the article serves as one way to implement
the plan4 8 . A small portion of the site falls under Article 38 which sets the maximum
45 Interview with Kevin F. Fitzgerald in May 2003.
46 The Chinatown Coalition and the Chinatown Community Plan define Chinatown's boundaries to be
roughly Essex St. to the north by Lincoln and Interstate 93 to the east by Washington and Tremont Streets
to the west, and Marginal Road to the south.
47 A portion of the site is in the Liberty Tree Protection area under Article 43. The maximum height
restriction in this area is 80 ft and the FAR is 7.48 Article 43 of Boston Zoning Code, Section 43-2.
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height limit at 155 ft and FAR at 10. In addition to zoning, the site is in the Restricted
Parking District of Boston which forbids off-street parking for non-residential uses unless
a conditional use permit is issued.
In January 2001 the project design transformed into a residential structure of similar scale
with a larger floor area of 650,341 square feet and the same height of 310 feet and FAR
at 11. Height and FAR variances were necessary from the Boston Zoning Board of
Appeals to realize the project. Of the proposed 430 rental units proposed, 20 were
allocated as affordable elderly housing units. In addition, a community room of
approximately 5100 square feet was to be constructed on-site for the residents of Hong
Lok House, an abutting elderly housing development. Furthermore, the project proposal
included 468 parking spaces4 9 and 8000 square feet of retail space. In August 2002,
Liberty Place received all the approvals needed to begin construction.
Neighborhood Organization, Unity, and Approach to the Process
There were two neighborhood groups that actively organized around Liberty Place. One
group supported Liberty Place and the other group opposed the project. Public comment
letters to the BRA reveal that those who supported the project included Hong Lok House
residents, some area business owners, and Chinatown Neighborhood Council (CNC)
members. Meanwhile, those who opposed the project primarily consisted of the
Chinatown Resident Association (CRA) and non-profit organizations such as the Chinese
Progressive Association (CPA), the Campaign to Protect Chinatown (CPC), the Asian
American Resource Workshop (AARW), and to some degree the Asian Community
Development Corporation 50 (ACDC).
Given that the intent of the case studies is to illustrate how downtown Boston
neighborhoods have effectuated project changes, this chapter will focus on the
neighborhood groups that opposed the projects and made demands for project changes
49 333 new and 135 existing spaces.
50 ACDC is one of two community developers in Chinatown. Some ACDC staff took issue with the project
but could not take an active stand because the organization was preparing for a project that shared
construction ties with Liberty Place. In addition, ACDC attempted to partner with Fitzgerald to explore a
public-private partnership to increase affordable housing on-site. However Fitzgerald had already partnered
with Charles E. Smith who could not take on ACDC as a partner because of stipulations governing a
publicly traded company.
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rather than those who supported the project. Therefore the actions of the CRA and its
allies in opposing Liberty Place have been more closely examined than Hong Lok House
and supporters of the project.
From the beginning, the CRA, residents, and organizational representatives from
Chinatown participated in the development process by submitting comment letters and
attending public meetings to request a height reduction in line with the architectural
fabric of the neighborhood. Financial justifications were consistently presented in the
form of losses that Fitzgerald incurred from years of no development on the site, benefits
to Hong Lok House, and the acquisition cost of surrounding parcels of land. Those who
opposed the project were not convinced that the project's benefits offset its violation of
zoning, noncompliance with the 1990 Community Plan, and implications in facilitating
gentrification and worsening traffic conditions.
Frustrated by the lack of response from the BRA and developer, CRA and other project
opponents formed Fight Liberty Place5 1 (FLP) in June 2001. The intent of establishing
FLP was to introduce an organized voice of opposition and make a presence once the
Draft Project Impact Report (DPIR) was submitted and the public comment period began.
FLP's campaign sought to reduce the project's scale as much as possible and to secure
the maximum amount of affordable housing. The group believed that Liberty Place
would be constructed as long as there was support for the project.
FLP recognized that to effectuate project changes, the group needed to position itself
strategically so that approval of Liberty Place depended on them. FLP came to the
conclusion that the most effective strategy would be to stall the process by trying to stop
the project. Operating under the premise that the economic climate would shift over time
and could negatively impact financing for large real estate developments, FLP planned to
prolong the process as long as possible in the hopes that in time it would be more cost-
effective for the developer and city to address FLP's demands than risk Liberty Place
from being built altogether.
51 FLP was mainly composed of the Chinatown Resident Association, the Campaign to Protect Chinatown,
the Chinese Progressive Association, and the Harry H. Dow Legal Assistance Fund. FLP also secured pro
bono legal representation from Greater Boston Legal Services and Alternatives for Community and
environment.
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A wide network was cast to advance FLP's position and assert a force of opposition
throughout the process. In the neighborhood, FLP carried out an aggressive public
education campaign to garner local support . One-page facts sheets about Liberty Place
were disseminated in and around the neighborhood. The fact sheets pointed out how the
project did not comply with the development restrictions outlined in the 1990 Community
Plan and 2000 Master Plan and its effect on the quality of life in Chinatown due to
limited affordable housing opportunities and traffic impacts. Outside of the neighborhood,
FLP gained legal support from Alternatives for Community and Environment (ACE) and
Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS). Additional support from organizations such as
the Boston Tenant Coalition, Alliance for Boston Neighborhoods, the Park Plaza Citizen
Advisory Committee, and concerned individuals were also extended to FLP. At the
organizational level, FLP was united and had a wide network of support. However, at the
neighborhood level, there was a clear division between those who supported and those
who opposed Liberty Place.
Tactics Used to Gain Institutional Support
FLP executed a variety of tactics to get the attention of the city. However, gaining
institutional support proved to be complicated because of the contingent of Liberty Place
supporters in the neighborhood. FLP needed to carefully consider the effects of each
tactic because there were parallel campaigns for and against Liberty Place. The group
used the process to make their demands known and develop a presence with the city.
When the city responded to FLP's demands, the group had to determine how to work
with the city without compromising their core demands.
Initially, FLP communicated to the city the level of opposition against Liberty Place. The
group carried out an aggressive door-to-door letter-writing campaign. Petitions were
drafted and signatures collected. At the 2001 August Moon Festival, FLP set up a booth
that informed festival goers of Liberty Place and had prepared the appropriate letter-
writing implements needed to write letters against the project. FLP then flooded the city
52 One sector that FLP targeted was the neighborhood tenant organizations. However, while the tenant
organizations were concerned about the project, many felt the project fell beyond their jurisdiction.
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with the letters and petitions opposing the project during the DPIR public comment
53
period
In conjunction with gathering grassroots support, FLP engaged the media as a means to
exert pressure on the mayor5 4 and developer5 5 to respond to the group's demands.
Articles appeared in the Boston Globe as well as the local Sampan and Chinese
newspapers. Internet publications such as aamovement.net and asianweek.com featured
articles about Liberty Place and the Chinatown neighborhood. The internet publications
were an effort to reach out to the larger Asian and progressive communities who
sympathized with and supported FLP's work. Public demonstrations and a referendum
were also carried out to publicize the opposition to Liberty Place.
The first public demonstration was Operation Car Jam which occurred from 12pm - 1pm
on March 1, 2002. The purpose of the event was to illustrate the potential traffic impacts
of the proposed Liberty project which would bring in an additional 350 vehicles and
1,700 car trips per day. Demonstrators drove motor vehicles around the block of the
56Liberty Place site repeatedly
Within ten days after the event, BRA director Mark Maloney requested to meet with FLP
to talk about Liberty Place. Maloney's decision to actively engage FLP in the process
indicates that the group had gained influence in the project. FLP used the opportunity to
reiterate three concerns that they expected the BRA to address 57. The demands involved:
(1) a presentation of alternative developments that comply with the Chinatown Master
Plan; (2) an increased residential voice in Chinatown's development review process; and
(3) an increase in the creation of low-income and affordable housing. It appears that
FLP's concerns were not adequately addressed because FLP did not slow its campaign
against Liberty Place nor show any level of project acceptance. The lack of positive
5 A parallel effort took place with those who supported the project. Hong Lok House residents and staff
organized a similar letter writing and petition campaign in favor of Liberty Place. In the end, the number of
letters supporting were comparable to those opposing the project.
54 Mayor Menino had been a champion of affordable housing and it was hoped that the low proportion of
affordable to market-rate units given the scale of the project would catch Menino's attention.
5 It was understood that negative press coverage of the project could negatively influence a lender's
decision to finance the project.
56 The event caught page 1 of the City Region section of the Boston Globe on March 2, 2002.
5 A letter cosigned by AARW, CPA, CPC, CRA, and Dow Fund to BRA director Mark Maloney on March
26, 2002.
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response from FLP may have prompted the BRA to initiate a series of Liberty Place
working sessions in April 2003. The sessions58 were "... to facilitate a constructive and
interactive dialogue about the specific issues surrounding the proposed project59 ".
However, despite FLP's explicit request that the BRA provide proper English language
support to ensure that residents could be directly involved in the process, communication
between the BRA and residents continued to flow through FLP. Without a proper balance
between addressing and including non-English speaking residents in the process, FLP
declined the invitation to participate in the focus session and, instead, offered
recommendations on how the content and structure of the working sessions could be
60more inclusive . This response reflects FLP's openness to working with the city and
developer under certain conditions6 1. Though individual FLP members participated in
some sessions, attendance was inconsistent and the comments made in the discussions
reiterated that the format was not conducive to addressing FLP's concerns.
With limited project changes in place, FLP organized "Chinatown Act Out! Against
Liberty Place" on June 7, 2002. Act Out was a street theatre demonstration in which a
call-and-response dialogue was acted out through giant-sized puppets. Over one hundred
residents and activists participated in the event and City Councilor Mickey Roach
extended support for their efforts by making an appearance and speaking at the rally. In
July, the BRA Board issued final approval of the project and waived further review under
Article 80.
In a last effort to affect the process through the Zoning Board of Appeals, FLP carried out
a referendum which was administered by the American Friends Service Committee and
the League of Women Voters of Boston on August 2nd and 3rd. Approximately 20% of the
adult population and a total of 923 votes were cast in the referendum. By a three-to-one
58 Six two-hour sessions were held over 9 weeks. The sessions were organized by topics such as traffic,
design, to real estate financing. Each session began with a presentation by the developer or a city
representative followed by a question-and-answer discussion. The city and developer drew from the
discussions to determine project changes. In June 2002, a progress report outlining the process and results
was printed and distributed and a community meeting was held to present the findings.
59 Letter from BRA director Mark Maloney to Andrew Leong of Campaign to Protect Chinatown.
* Letter from CPC to BRA Director Mark Maloney on April 15, 2002.
61 A letter by FLP to Maloney dated April 15, 2002 describes the recommendations to be (1) A walking
tour of Chinatown (2) Broader discussion of Chinatown development (3) Liberty Place visioning to begin
with master plan (4) Addressing the gentrification threat and (5) Increasing resident inclusion.
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ratio Chinatown residents opposed Liberty Place 62. A press conference was held to
publicize the results63 . The Zoning Board of Appeals then by unanimous vote issued the
variances needed for the project. With approvals from both the BRA Board and Boston
Zoning Board of Appeals, construction of Liberty Place could begin.
Following the issuance of the variances, CPA 64 and an abutting resident of Liberty Place
filed a lawsuit6 5 against the city which resulted in a legal settlement6 6 . The lawsuit caused
the city to secure financial contributions from the developers to specifically address the
lawsuit. The terms of the settlement suggest that FLP finally gained institutional support
by forcing the city to address FLP's demands in isolation from Liberty Place supporters.
Until the lawsuit, the demands of FLP were disconnected from what the developer and
city were willing to offer. The legal settlement, the terms of which are described later in
this chapter, illustrates how a lawsuit can be an effective tactic in garnering institutional
support after tactics in the process are exhausted. The lawsuit finally caused the city to
commit and place weight on implementing development according to Chinatown's
master plans.
From organizing the neighborhood to building allies to using the media to carrying out
public demonstrations to implementing a referendum to filing a lawsuit, FLP executed a
number of creative and aggressive tactics to gain institutional support. However, it was
not until the lawsuit that the city directly addressed the demands of FLP and residents
who opposed the project. In the end, the city and developer directly addressed issues with
general development in Chinatown. However, the changes were not upheld in the Liberty
Place project. As a result, Liberty Place will still be built beyond the legal zoning limit
and the neighborhood will have to absorb traffic density, and wind impacts that the
62 In the same month, Smith of the Liberty Place development team organized a table at the 2002 August
Moon Festival to build support. Attendees were invited to sign a petition supporting Liberty Place. Those
that signed the petition were entered into a raffle with a chance to win a free meal at a local restaurant.
63 By a 17 to 1 ratio the voters stated that the adult entertainment district be rezoned and by a 15 to 1 ratio
the residents thought that the city should establish a stronger development review process for Chinatown
residents.
" CPA was an active member of FLP and a tenant in a building abutting the site.
65 CPA and the abutting resident received pro bono legal representation from Greater Boston Legal
Services (GBLS).
66 The plaintiffs did not have formal legal standing as tenant abutters to the site. Had the case gone to court
the best decision the plaintiffs could have hoped for was a decision to remand the zoning decision back to
the Zoning Board of Appeals. If this were to happen, the zoning board would have reviewed the case again
and taken another vote which may have reaffirmed their original decision.
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project produces. The amount of resources and number of tactics that FLP used during
the process suggests that sometimes neighborhood groups need to exercise aggressive
tactics and exert extreme pressure on the city before neighborhood demands are directly
addressed.
Neighborhood Demands
FLP's comment letters to the DPIR were a combination of project demands and
criticisms of the project's impacts. Both are described and evaluated below. All FLP
correspondences were administered through the Campaign to Protect Chinatown.
Therefore, the following demands were drawn from letters drafted by and on behalf of
the Campaign to Protect Chinatown67 . It is important to note that additional demands may
have been made in other forums such as at public meetings or in newspaper articles.
However, in the interest of maintaining a consistent methodology between the three case
studies, additional demands have not been included in Figure 2 nor in the following
description of demands.
1. Reject the DPIR and require the developer to submit another project impact report.
a. The Liberty Place proposal violates the land use policies and principles of
68the 1990 Chinatown Community Plan
b. The Liberty Place proposal violates zoning wherein the legal height limit
is 100 feet and maximum FAR is at 7.
c. The environmental impacts described in the DPIR are flawed and do not
adequately describe traffic, wind, and other impacts.
d. The project's impact on area historical resources is not adequately
evaluated.
2. Submit a supplemental DPIR or new project impact report that addresses the
above issues and include the following.
67There were three letters submitted of which two were submitted by FLP's legal representatives. One letter
was submitted by Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS) on February 20, 2002 and the other was
submitted by Alternatives for Community and Environment (ACE) on February 19, 2002. A letter by the
Campaign to Protect Chinatown was submitted on February 15, 2002.
68Liberty Place supported the goals of housing creation in Chinatown's master plans. In this respect the
community plan supported both FLP and the developer.
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a. Evaluation of the cumulative adverse impacts caused by Liberty Place in
conjunction with developments in construction, proposed, and planned in
and around Chinatown.
b. More details regarding the level and permanency of affordable units and
community retail space, particularly with the affordable housing units
dispersed throughout the building. In the current proposal 50 out of 70 are
69located in the building . There should be a legally enforceable mechanism
to keep the units affordable in perpetuity.
c. Address how the affordable units will accommodate families.
d. Provide a percentage of affordable housing proportional to the zoning
relief requested.
e. Translation to allow non-English speaking residents to participate
f. Drastically reduce the amount of space to parking. It has been
recommended that the project operate exclusively on a "zip car" system
where residents do not own cars and agree not to register any auto in the
city of Boston.
3. Increase resident input through a two-prong test. First the BRA should defer to the
residents' assessment of whether the mitigation and benefits provided adequately
offset violation of the community plan. It is the residents who will be bearing the
cost of the decision. Second, any mitigation and benefits should be of a scale
commensurate with the zoning exception sought.
4. An Impact Study was requested of the BRA. The study would involve a combined
analysis of Kensington Place and Liberty Place so that the public can have a
more accurate representation of the projects' future impact on the neighborhood.
69 In the Notice of Project Change (NPC), 20 units were allocated affordable. In the DPIR, 70 units were
allocated affordable of which 50 would be dispersed in the main building and 20 in the abutting Hong Lok
House.
70 Kensington Place is a project of similar scale to and proposed across the street from Liberty Place.
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Project Changes
Liberty Place underwent two phases of project changes. The first phase of changes was
documented in the Notice of Project Change (NPC) which fundamentally transformed the
project from an office and hotel to a residential development. The next set of changes is
documented in the DPIR. The following project changes compare the final project against
the NPC. The final changes were based on a description of Liberty Place in the BRA
Board Memorandum of August 1, 2002. This memorandum reiterates the conditions that
the board considered before issuing final approval and waiving further review under
Article 80. A request for the cooperation agreement for Liberty Place was made at the
BRA. However, the staff could not locate the document. Therefore, the description below
does not detail the final project terms outlined in the cooperation agreement. A review of
the variances granted by the Zoning Board of Appeals on September 11, 2002 confirms
dimensional components of the project71 . The changes are compared to project details
outlined in the Notice of Project Change and described below.
1. The height of the project was reduced by a total of 3 stories from 310 feet to 275
feet and stands at 28-stories.
2. Massing was reduced by 5%.
3. Affordable housing units increased from 20 to 64 units.
4. Total number of units increased from 430 to 439.
5. Setbacks were increased along Washington Street (from 10 to 16 feet) and Beach
Street (from 35 to 55 feet) to improve pedestrian way.
6. Parking was increased from 468 to 471 spaces.
7. Garage entrances were redesigned to minimize traffic.
8. Commercial space would be leased to Chinatown businesses at a rate comparable
to other neighborhood retail lease rates.
In addition, the terms of the lawsuit settlement include the following.
71 There is a discrepancy in the number of parking spaces and affordable housing units approved by the
BRA board and the ZBA. Whereas the BRA approved a total of 64 units of housing, the ZBA decision
stated that 66 affordable units would be created. In addition, the BRA approved a 471 parking spaces while
the ZBA decision states a "455-vehicle parking garage" would be constructed.
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1. The City of Boston will grant the Chinatown Resident Association, or a council
democratically established by the body, to have the function and authority of a
"neighborhood council."
2. The developer and property owner of the Liberty Place site will contribute
$575,000 and the City of Boston will contribute $75,000 to a specially designated
fund for the purpose of developing 30 units of permanently affordable, low-
income, single room occupancy housing in Chinatown.
3. The City of Boston will acquire or designate a site for the low-income housing,
assist the future developer in securing public financing, and make best efforts in
ensuring that the project be developed within a two-year time frame.
4. Terms of the project and its developer will be subject to the approval of the
plaintiff (the nonprofit community organization 72) or its designee.
5. The City of Boston agrees to discuss future implementation of the Chinatown
Master Plan with both the nonprofit community organization and the Chinatown
Resident Association.
6. The owner and developer of the Liberty Place site will provide relocation
assistance to the plaintiffs.
Evaluating Project Outcome
A comparison of changes to Liberty Place measured against FLP's demands reveal that
the process led to mixed success. An overview of the demands and changes according to
five factors is illustrated in Table 2. FLP's demands involved two levels of change. First
FLP was concerned with the physical elements of Liberty Place and the direct impacts it
would have on the neighborhood.
7 The nonprofit community organization worked with residents to create the Chinatown Resident
Association (CRA) and advocated for resident representation in the physical development of the
neighborhood.
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Demands Changes
Use e No demands. - No changes.
Dimensions - Maximum height of 100 feet. - Height reduced from 310 to 271 feet.
- Units and massing be in accordance - Units increased from 430 to 439 units.
with zoning. - Massing reduced from 650,341 to 617,824
e Significantly fewer parking spaces. SF.
- Parking spaces increased from 468 to 471.
Design e No demands. - Garage entrance redesigned to minimize
traffic.
* Setbacks increased on Washington (from
10 to 16 feet from street edge) and (from
35 to 55 feet from street) Beach Streets.
Affordable - Affordable housing allocation should e Affordable units set to 15% and increased
Housing proportional to zoning relief from 20 to 64.
requested.
Mitigation e Combined impact analysis study of * City and developer contributions for
Liberty Place and Kensington Place. permanently affordable SRO units.
* Reject DPIR and submit new or e City will acquire or build SRO units in two
supplementary report to present a years.
development that conforms to the e CPA approval of new housing project.
1990 Community Plan and zoning e Developer will help abutter relocate.
and addresses issues discussed in - Implementation of master plan with CPA
comment letters. and CRA.
- A city-recognized formal resident - CRA authority equivalent to the CNC.
voice in development in the e 10 Zip cars will be available in the parking
neighborhood. structure.
e Implement exclusive zip car system. * Lease commercial space to Chinatown
e Chinese translation of DPIR should businesses at a rate comparable to other
be available. neighborhood retail lease rates.
" Implement a two-prong test to
determine adequacy of mitigation
and benefits.
* FLP demands were drawn from letters submitted to the DPIR by the Campaign to Protect Chinatown or on
behalf of the organization. A total of three letters were identified. They included a letters by the Campaign to Protect
Chinatown, Greater Boston Legal Services, and Alternatives for Community and Environment. The final changes are
based on project details in the Notice of Project Change, DPIR, and BRA Board Memorandum of August 1, 2002. A
cooperation agreement could not be found at the BRA.
Table 2. Overview of FLP demands and project changes of Liberty Place. Additional design and use demands may have
been made at public meetings and through newspaper articles. However, they are not included in this table.
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Second, FLP weaved Liberty Place into the larger systemic issue of general development
in Chinatown. In this respect, Liberty Place embodied the negative direction of
development in the neighborhood and adds to the cumulative effects that the residents
would have to absorb from surrounding large-projects. In addition, FLP believed
approval of Liberty Place at the size and scale proposed posed serious implications for
future development in the area.
On a project level, changes that occurred relative to the resources that FLP used to fight
the project led to minimal dimensional effects. A 5.7% overall change in the massing and
11.3% decrease in the height still put the project in noncompliance with zoning and the
Chinatown master plans. Three noteworthy dimensional changes occurred from the NPC
Liberty Place Dimensional Changes
Changes From NPC to Final Approval
Total Residential Units
Affordable Units
Retail/Commercial (sf)
Other (sf)
Total Floor Area of Project
Height (ft)
FAR
Total parking spaces
Initial Proposal
430
20
8000
5100
650,341
310
11
468
Approved Changes 1% Change I
439
64
6289
none
613,072
275
none
471
0%
0%
-5.7%
-11.3%
0%
Changes from DPIR to Final Approval
Total Residential Units
Affordable Units
Retail/Commercial (sf)
Other (sf)
Total Floor Area of Project
Height (ft)
FAR
Total parking spaces
DPIR
6 4
468
70
8000
5100
650,341
291
11
491
Approved Changes 1% Char
439
64
6289
none
613,072
275
none
471
-21.31/0
0%
-5.7%
-5.5%
0%
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Table 3. Dimensional changes made to the Liberty Place project. Final project changes were based
on the BRA Board Memorandum of August 1, 2002.
I
_ .
_
to the DPIR and prior to the formal demands made by FLP73 . Illustrated in Table 3,
affordable units increased from 20 to 70 units or 250%, parking spaces increased 4.9%
from 468 to 491 spaces, and the total number of units increased 8.8% from 430 to 468.
This fluctuation in dimensions from the NPC to the DPIR detracts from the net changes
that occurred. That is, what appeared to be a 6.2% decrease in the number of residential
units was actually a 2% increase from the NPC. Also, a 230% increase in affordable units
is misleading because the original 20 units proposed fell 50% short of the city's
inclusionary housing policy. And a comparison of the units listed in the DPIR reveal that
in fact a 5.7% reduction in floor area led to a 9.3% reduction in affordable housing. The
proportion of affordable housing units to total housing units decreased by 0.4% from
14.9% in the DPIR to 14.5% at final project approval. Furthermore, the parking spaces
appear to have decreased from the DPIR to final approval when in actuality, a net 0.2%
increase or an addition of 3 spaces occurred. By these terms and according to Figure 3,
the two most substantial and positive changes that occurred were in height and floor area,
though the height still stands 175% higher than zoning and the floor area ratio remained
unchanged at 57% greater than FLP's demands.
With respect to the greater issue of development in the neighborhood, FLP made
significant gains in securing institutional support to address root issues of resident
representation and the enforcement of the master plan. In fact, FLP's core organizations
had been advocating for the two issues for years. The single room occupancy (SRO) units
were unanticipated additions to their demands and would address specific housing needs
in the neighborhood. However, given the limited number of developable parcels
remaining in the neighborhood, Liberty Place is still being built at a considerable cost for
the neighborhood. Traffic and associated environmental health issues will be substantial,
particularly in light of the several other projects of similar scale built in close vicinity.
The terms of the legal settlement and emphasis on resident involvement and the master
plan suggest that Liberty Place was a valuable opportunity to illustrate both the short- and
long-term impacts of such a large project while at the same time leverage core demands
73 FLP had begun organizing, contacting media, and making project demands in summer 2001 and prior to
the release of the DPIR. However, the demands were not formally received by the BRA until the DPIR
comment period occurred.
46
that the plaintiffs believed would enable residents to be more influential in affecting
development in Chinatown.
The combination of tactics that drew public attention and built support was effective in
getting the attention of the BRA. Even so, using the process aggressively did not lead to
significant project changes. The lawsuit was the key mechanism that forced the city and
BRA to directly respond to FLP's demands. Without a resolution to the lawsuit,
construction of Liberty Place would have been held up even longer. The lawsuit, in this
respect proved to be an effective tactic once all pressure points had been exerted in the
process.
Conclusion
The Chinatown neighborhood was divided into two coalitions on Liberty Place and ran
parallel campaigns. The focus of the case study revolves around FLP which opposed
Liberty Place and tied the project to the larger systemic issues that inhibited residents
from having a real voice in the development of Chinatown. FLP committed its resources
to tackling both the physical and environmental impacts of Liberty Place as well as its
implications in the development of the neighborhood. A review of project changes
reveals that the tactics that FLP exercised enabled the group to gain institutional support
to establish mechanisms that can facilitate more resident influence in future Chinatown
developments. However, on a project level, FLP made limited gains. It was not until the
lawsuit that the city decided to address FLP's specific demands rather than provide
justifications for the project. The impact of Liberty Place will be great for Chinatown and
some residents saw its approval as a means for residents to play a more decisive role in
the development of their neighborhood.
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Chapter 4: Dover Residences
The South End Neighborhood
The South End occupies just over one square mile (659 acres) of the City of Boston. The
neighborhood is bounded by the Massachusetts Turnpike, the Back Bay neighborhood
and Chinatown to the north. Along its eastern border is the Southeast Expressway and to
the southwest are Melnea Cass Boulevard and the Roxbury neighborhood. To the west,
the South End is bounded by the Southwest Corridor. In the 1900s, the South End was
predominantly a working-class neighborhood that was selected as an urban renewal area
in the 1950s. In the 1970s, demolition of vacant buildings on Washington Street, a major
thoroughfare in the neighborhood and city, caused the area to be dominated by bare and
dilapidated city- and BRA-owned land. In 2003, 60% of the 1.5 mile length of
Washington Street remains vacant74.
The South End is primarily residential with a population7 5 of 28,239 and 22
neighborhood associations. An influx of young professionals and homeowners into the
neighborhood in the early 1990s led to a significant population shift whereby 45.3% of
the population identify themselves as white and 22.7% identify themselves as Black or
African Americans 76 . This is a notable difference from the previous decade when 39.4%
of residents were identified as white and 31.7% were identified as Black or African
American77. The influx of new residents has largely contributed to a restoration of the
housing stock. Many units have been converted into larger apartments and condominiums.
In addition, parts of the South End have been home to local artists for decades.
The South End/Lower Roxbury Development Policy Plan, which was published in
January 1994, serves as the official neighborhood master plan. However, developments
along Washington Street have been planned and approved according to a report called A
New Washington Street which was created by the Lower Washington Street Task Force
74 Interview with Randi Lathrop, Boston Redevelopment Authority planner for the South End and South
End resident.
75 BRA publication 554, April 2002
76 BRA publication 547, July 2001.
77 Ibid.
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78and spearheaded by the mayor . Already 600 million dollars have been invested in the
area and 900 of the 1500 housing units created have been designated affordable79 . Most
projects consist of mixed-use and ground floor retail developments that conform to the
Washington Street plan.
A central figure in the task force and in the general development of the South End is
Randi Lathrop. Lathrop"0 is a long-time South End resident who chaired the 26-member
task force and currently serves as BRA project manager and planner for the South End.
Following the task force's planning process, specific task force members established
Washington Gateway Main Streets"l, hereinafter referred as "Gateway", to monitor use,
design, and dimensional elements of development on the street.
Project Description
Dover Residences is primarily a residential project that the developer, Demetrios Dasco
of Atlas Investment Group, submitted to the City of Boston on April 9, 2002. Prior to
submitting the project and entering the city's public review process, Atlas committed 18
months to working with the Old Dover Neighborhood Association, hereafter referred as
ODNA, to fashion a project that adequately addressed ODNA's concerns. ODNA
primarily involved residents from the Columbia/City Lights Building82 and Laconia
Lofts 3 , the two condominiums that flank the project. On September 24, 2002 and five
months into Article 80, the BRA waived further review of Article 80 and issued final
approval of the project84.
78 In response to numerous concerns voiced by South End residents about the piecemeal approach to
development along Washington Street, Boston Mayor Thomas Menino appointed a task force called the
Lower Washington Street Task Force to create a development plan for the street in 1995. Over the next two
years the task force carried out a neighborhood visioning and planning process and rezoned Washington
Street to comply with their plan. The plan involved building back large-scalt mixed-use developments on
the street.
79 Affordable in this case refers to 80-120% of Area Median Income (AMI) in the City of Boston.80 Lathrop also presides over the Washington Gateway Main Streets Board of Trustees.
81 Gateway is mainly concerned with a project's height, lighting, main entrance design, parking, loading,
and ventilation. In addition, the group works to ensure that ground-floor retail with a strong street and door
Presence occurs on Washington Street.
The City Lights/Columbia building consists of nonprofit space and approximately 9 condominium unit.
83Laconia Lofts was constructed just several years prior to the introduction of Dover Residences. The
complex contains approximately 100 market and affordable condo units. A portion of the units have been
allocated for artists.
84 Construction of Dover Residences was scheduled for Fall 2003.
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The site is 47,780 square feet and bounded by East Berkeley Street, Harrison Avenue,
Fay Street and Washington Street in the South End. Figure 3 illustrates where the site is
relative to the South End neighborhood. The site is made up of 4 urban renewal parcels
which are privately owned but also under the purview of the BRA and subject to
conditions set by the BRA. The site is also governed by Article 64 of the Boston Zoning
Code which limits the height to 70 feet and FAR at 4. Situated in the city's Restricted
Parking Overlay District, off-street parking for non-residential use is banned unless a
conditional use permit is granted from the Zoning Board of Appeals. Lastly, the site is
located in a historic district and subject to approval by the Boston Landmarks
Commission.
Figure 3. Boundaries of the South End neighborhood and location of Dover Residences
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In the beginning of 2001, Atlas approached the BRA about developing a project on a
portion of the current site. Prior to Atlas, two developers had presented development
plans on the site and were rejected by the neighborhood. Like the previous developers,
Atlas presented an 80-foot-high block building along the entire length of the site which
the neighborhood rejected85. Lathrop of the BRA conveyed that Dasco needed to receive
formal support from ODNA before entering Article 8086. Following the recommendation
of ODNA, Atlas acquired abutting parcels of land to expand the site and propose a
residential complex. Appendix A provides a timeline of key events in the development of
Dover Residences.
The PNF for Dover Residences states that the project would be approximately 200,000
square feet of residential, retail, and parking space fronting Washington Street and across
the street from a local park named Peters Park. The proposed development consisted of
188 parking spaces, approximately 15,000 square feet of ground floor commercial and
retail space, and 140 rental units of which 14 would be affordable8 7 . The project would
stand at a maximum height of 80 feet (7 stories tall) and be at an FAR of 4.18. An urban
renewal district88 (U-District) designation from the Boston Zoning Commission was
sought and secured to address the zoning.
Neighborhood Organization, Unity, and Approach to the Process
From the beginning, ODNA had been designated by the BRA 89as the primary
neighborhood group to represent the South End in regard to Dover Residences. ODNA
largely represented the abutting residents who would be directly and most severely
impacted by Dover Residences. At the adjacent Laconia condo development, units were
sold with assurance that the large north-facing windows would continue to provide
85 Records of the original block building design were not available at the BRA because the design occurred
prior to the Article 80 process.
6 Interview with Demetrios Dasco of Atlas Investment Group, LLC on May 19, 2003.
87 Affordable for this project means 80-120% Area Median Income (AMI).
88 The use and dimensional conditions of a U-District override the existing zoning.
89 Since there is no South End neighborhood council nor body that serves the role of a council, the South
End development process looks to the neighborhood associations to provide approval on a project.
According to interviews with Lathrop and neighborhood association members, the neighborhood
associations most impacted by a project are identified and invited by the BRA to take part in the process,
though other neighborhood members and organizations may also participate in the process,
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extensive light and views after development occurred on adjacent parcels90 , which Dover
Residences would violate. Meanwhile the City Lights/Columbia residents of the other
abutting property were mainly concerned with the loss of light and environmental
impacts since the project would sit several feet away from their units. The residents of
Laconia and City Lights/Columbia agreed that it would be more effective to work as one
body and one voice in affecting changes to the development than as separate bodies.
Together they became the core force of ODNA and participated in the process with this
united approach.
No neighborhood group challenged the designation nor requested to be fully involved in
the planning process. Although Gateway would monitor specific elements of the project
according to the criteria set by its board and charter, it defers to the neighborhood groups
on all other issues of a project l. Neighborhood groups have interpreted some of
Gateway's development decisions as favoring business over residents and affirming the
mayor's position at the expense of the neighborhood.
In the case of Dover Residences, comment letters from Gateway and personal
communication with the president of ODNA suggest that Gateway may have complicated
the negotiation process. In a letter 92 to the BRA dated July 29, 2002 Gateway stated that
"(W)ith the majority of significant design and massing issues resolved to our satisfaction
and in keeping with our vision of a revitalized Washington St. Gateway now defers to the
Old Dover Neighborhood Association for resolution of issues with greater impact on their
neighborhood." This sentiment confirms how Gateway saw its role relative to the
neighborhood associations. However, weeks earlier, and prior to lending full support of
the project, Gateway drafted a separate letter in which "Washington Gateway would like
to request that our organization be considered as one of the beneficiaries of any
93"1
community benefit funds to be offered as part of the Dover Residences development"
90 Stated in letter by Robert A. Wells to Maria Faria of the BRA RE: Comments on Dover Residences PNF
on May 23, 2002.
91 Interview with Sheila Grove of Washington Main Streets on March 14, 2003
92 Letter from Herb Fremin of Gateway to the BRA on July 29, 2002.
93 Letter from Gateway to BRA director Mark Maloney on July 8, 20029'.
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Gateway's request could have compromised ODNA's influence over and demands of the
project 4 . Initial meetings between ODNA and Atlas revolved around design changes and
appropriate mitigation for those directly impacted by the project. However, Gateway's
request for mitigation could have forced Atlas to balance ODNA's demands against
Gateway's request. Fortunately, Gateway's request did not explicitly affect ODNA's
negotiations with Atlas and it is unclear which, if any, community benefits were
specifically targeted for Gateway.
Tactics Used to Gain Institutional Support
The institutional support extended to ODNA and South End residents was established
through the work of the Lower Washington Street Task Force a few years prior to Dover
Residences. The work of the task force enabled the neighborhood to garner institutional
support on two levels. First, Lathrop's leadership in the task force and activism in the
neighborhood contributed to the BRA's decision to offer her a position in the city's
planning department and implement the new Washington Street plan. Lathrop accepted
the position which placed her in a strategic position in that she represented both the city
and the neighborhood. She could lend institutional support at the BRA level and affect
the development process in a way that the neighborhood could not.
Second, the neighborhood gained institutional support from the mayor. That is, Mayor
Menino's popularity increased in the South End when he initiated the task force and
appointed its members. The task force attributed its success to the mayor. The mayor, in
turn, was more responsive and supportive of the residents' concerns as a way to maintain
his base of support and popularity in the South End. This responsiveness represented
another source of institutional support that ODNA could have tapped if negotiation with
the BRA and developer proved unsuccessful. In the case of Dover Residences, the
development and negotiation process did not require mayoral support because Lathrop
responded sufficiently to the neighborhood's demands.
ODNA's credibility as a neighborhood association was built upon the leadership and
expertise that ODNA members displayed in affecting previous projects proposed on the
94 Even though Lathrop served as president of the Gateway board, there were no indications that she had
used her BRA position to encourage Gateway to seek benefits.
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same site. This history with the site compounded by the absence of opposition between
neighborhood groups led the BRA to look to ODNA for neighborhood approval. In fact
the condition95 that Atlas needed to secure ODNA support before entering Article 80
affirmed ODNA's standing and allowed the group to play a decisive role in shaping the
project. In essence, the collaboration between Atlas and ODNA was brokered and
monitored by Lathrop. ODNA did not need to employ specific tactics to gain institutional
support. Instead, ODNA's main challenge was maintaining a positive working
relationship with Lathrop and persuading Atlas to incorporate ODNA's suggestions into
the project. To this end, ODNA needed to be persistent in its demands, closely monitor
the process, and maintain constant communication with the city and developer to ensure
that the group was fully involved. These tactics enabled ODNA to fundamentally change
the scope and design of the project.
Throughout the process, ODNA explicitly and firmly conveyed what was acceptable and
not acceptable for the site. The biweekly meetings96 between Atlas and ODNA during the
first six months brought to the surface the absence of a structure for resolving differences.
It appeared that Atlas and ODNA were creating the process as they went along which led
to mutual frustration. Then upon Lathrop's recommendation, Atlas hired a consultant to
work with the neighborhood directly 97 . This led to a more cooperative relationship
between the developer and ODNA.
The biweekly meetings and ODNA's clear stance against the original project proposal
likely influenced Atlas' decision to acquire surrounding parcels and expand the project
site". ODNA suggested site expansion after assessing properties surrounding the site". A
larger site would allow a larger project to be created and mitigate the obstruction of views
95 There was no written agreement or contract outlining the terms in which Dover Residences should enter
Article 80. It was Lathrop who verbally communicated this condition to Dasco of Atlas Investments.
96 The meetings were also monitored by Lathrop.
97 In an interview with Dasco of Atlas, Dasco stated that hiring a consultant eased the relationship between
Atlas and ODNA substantially and was a turning point in the collaboration.
98 The cost of acquiring the additional parcels was far greater than Atlas anticipated because of a city-
imposed "flip tax" that the property owners of the sites passed onto Atlas. Atlas, however, was not aware of
the additional costs until well into the process.
99 The vast majority of residents was property owners and knew the real estate in the area. ODNA
suggested that Atlas acquire surrounding parcels which were mainly urban renewal parcels subject to BRA
conditions.
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and light 0 0 . In November 2001 and on the day that ODNA was to take an official vote on
the original project design, Atlas requested that the group delay voting until a new design
was presented. ODNA agreed to delay its vote and was under the impression that its
members would be involved in the design of the new project.
However, ODNA's relationship with Atlas was less cooperative because the group was
excluded from the process despite constant inquiries with the BRA and Atlas. It was not
until February 2002 that Atlas and the BRA presented the new plans for the first time to
ODNA. During the period from November 2001 to February 2002, the BRA also secured
mitigation by requiring that Atlas finance street improvements on Fay Street' at a cost
of $600,000. This led ODNA to question both the process and the level of institutional
support they had. Not only did it appear that the neighborhood was competing with the
city for benefits before there was mutual agreement on the project design, but ODNA was
left out of the project's redesign even though the design would directly affect ODNA
members.
ODNA's persistence and involvement in the process intensified in April 2002 when the
group was excluded from additional project changes that occurred in the PNF. The PNF
included a headhouse which ODNA had not been notified about and the addition violated
the conditions under which ODNA issued its approval. It was understood that "at our
March 2002 meeting, the Old Dover Neighborhood Association voted to conditionally
support the proposed development as long as a series of design and massing conditions
and mitigation agreements were met' 0 2,'. As a result, ODNA members expressed
reservations about the project and the headhouse was subsequently removed. The
relatively immediate removal of the headhouse reflects the influence that ODNA
maintained in the process even though BRA records reveal that the majority of comment
103letters supported the project
100 Experience with the first two development proposals made it clear to ODNA that development on the
original site was infeasible as long as developers continued to present projects that obstructed light and
views of abutters.
101 Fay Street is a small street that borders Dover Residences.
102 Letter from Liz Cahill to Maria Faria RE: the Dover Residences PNF application on May 22, 2002.
Cahill is an 18 year resident of South End and president of the Old Dover Neighborhood Association.103 BRA records indicate that comment letters from three neighborhood organizations (ODNA, Bradford
Street Association, and Gateway) and 39 individuals were submitted.
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ODNA continued to negotiate project materials and terms of mitigation with Atlas after
the project received BRA board approval in August 2002 and the necessary zoning
exception'04 in September 2002. During the process, some ODNA members felt that the
Fay Street improvements limited the amount of money allocated for public improvements
that the neighborhood would have liked to see. In February 2003, a cooperation
agreement that outlined the terms and mitigation to be provided by Atlas was signed
without ODNA's knowledge and after ODNA had explicitly requested to be a co-
signor1 0 5 of the document. For the BRA and Atlas to determine the terms of agreement
without consulting ODNA and after the group's investment in the process intensified the
distrust that members' harbored towards the BRA and Atlas.
Although ODNA was excluded from key points in the process, the persistence, diligence,
and unity with which the group worked with the city and Atlas were particularly effective
in influencing project changes. In addition, the process was contained in the
neighborhood which allowed ODNA to focus its energy on the project itself and bypass
potential complications that could have occurred had there been negative press coverage
or competing interests with allies. The president of ODNA attended at least 75 meetings
over the two year process to ensure that the residents were always involved. The close
monitoring of the project and constant communication with Lathrop and Atlas enabled
the group to maintain institutional support from Lathrop and the BRA. This also caused
ODNA, the BRA, and Atlas to be immediately aware of any significant changes to the
project.
Neighborhood Demands
ODNA's demands were conveyed in their comment letter to the PNFio6. Additional
demands that were not documented in the comment letter may have been made. However,
these demands are not included below or in Table 4. According to Robert Wells, an
ODNA member and City Lights resident, ODNA's principal concerns were adequate
compensation or replacement of lost light and air, particularly for the rear units of the
104 Dover Residences received an U-District designation from the Boston Zoning Commission
105 ODNA understood that the legal terms governing a cooperation agreement do not allow neighborhood
groups like ODNA to be a co-signor.
106 Letter from Liz Cahill to Maria Faria RE: the Dover Residences PNF application on May 22, 2002.
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City Lights Building and access to affordable parking. The comment letter did not
include access to affordable parking which suggests that the issue was resolved prior to
the Article 80 process. ODNA's demands are briefly outlined below.
1. Height and Massing: Massing should not enlarge beyond 78 feet in one part of the
project, 38 feet in another and 70 feet in yet other section of the project. Any
mechanicals extending beyond 70 should be kept to minimum dimensions or
placed in the interior of the building. On Fay St height should be limited to 60 feet,
including mechanicals.
2. Light: Light wells should be a combined design of curved and stepped back
configuration proposed by Robert Wells at a community meeting. The light well
and windows facing Laconia should be unobtrusive.
3. Design integration with Laconia: The project and its windows should be set at an
angle that is unobtrusive and better integrated with the Laconia North wall
4. Courtyard: Courtyard incursions should be removed and designed with a wide
opening as promised and shown at a community meeting. Landscaping on terrace
should be treated with the same seriousness as building materials. The trees, trellis
and other mechanical structures should not obstruct light and air. Maintenance of
plants should be clearly defined.
5. Garage and Traffic: Garage entrance roof need to be resolved with direct abutters.
All traffic flow issues should be resolved to the satisfaction of the abutters,
including egress into and out of garage. All traffic conditions and patterns should
be successfully resolved.
6. Bridge: A bridge over Fay Street at the Harrison Avenue intersection should be
created.
7. Townhouse: The townhouse structure on Fay should remain 32 feet away from
the NE corner of the City Lights building and no balconies at the end of the
structure facing west.
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8. Housing and Retail: Small neighborhood businesses should be encouraged and no
chain stores of any kind should be allowed. ODNA encourages the sale of
residential units as condos.
9. Other: The first floor fire door located at the rear of City Lights needs to be
addressed. The pocket park behind the New Boston development should be
retained. Mitigation of all major impacts must be agreed upon prior to
construction.
Project Changes
After the BRA board unanimously approved the project in August 2002, negotiations
between the neighborhood and Dasco continued. A cooperation agreement 0 7 for Dover
Residences was signed on February 13, 2003 and the following summarizes the changes
described in the agreement.
1. Light: Light wells will be curved, expanded and stepped back to lessen negative
impacts on City Lights residents. A second light well will be installed to improve
the west wall of Washington Street facing Laconia.
2. Design integration with Laconia: The back of buildings have been redesigned and
stepped back so that the structure looks less massive. Atlas will consult with
ODNA and Laconia Trustees to formulate a final design configuration for the
light well and roof designs adjacent to Laconia.
3. Courtyard: The courtyard landscape design will maximize natural light to City
Lights and the lower floors of Laconia.
4. Housing and Retail: Total residential units will be reduced from 140 to 133 units.
The vast majority will be condos and some will be rental units.
5. Other: Substantial improvement will be made to Fay Street, including a new Fay
Street fence. New utilities, sidewalks and street lighting will occur. Atlas will
contribute $40,000 to Peters Park. Atlas will underwrite central air conditioning
systems for the 5 units in the City Lights building that abut the project. A new
107 A cooperation agreement is a legal document between the BRA and developer. The document outlines
the terms and mitigation that the developer will provide.
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skylight for the City Lights building will be installed. An emergency egress at the
rear west door of the City Lights School and building will be established. Parking
rights for Laconia and City Lights residents will be allocated. Six single parking
spaces and four double spaces will be available for rental or sale.
Evaluating Project Outcome
A review of ODNA demands and changes to Dover Residences shows that the main
emphases were on design and mitigation. Table 4 provides a table of the changes relative
to demands and illustrates that the majority of demands were addressed. The most notable
defeat that ODNA faced was the pedestrian bridge, which received strong support from
the residents and Atlas but was denied by the Landmarks Commission and the Boston
Civic Design Commission. The pedestrian bridge violated principles set in Boston's
historic districts and therefore could not be approved by the two commissions. Another
challenge was the 7-feet high mechanicals on the top floor of one building which ODNA
would have liked to eliminate. However, ODNA members recognized that significant
changes in the massing had already occurred and many of their issues had been addressed
so the mechanicals were accepted in the interest of advancing the project. With the
exception of the bridge and mechanicals, ODNA proved to be fairly successful in
influencing the project from the shape of the site to the design of light wells.
What contributed to ODNA's success seemed to be a combination of the tactics used and
Lathrop's role in the process. ODNA's persistence in maintaining communication with
Atlas and Lathrop and consistent demands made it difficult for Atlas and the city to divert
the issues. For example, had there been a clear division between members of ODNA, the
issues could have been blurred by internal conflicts in the neighborhood. Also, ODNA's
constant communication would have made it difficult for Atlas and the city to justify
collaborations independent of the neighborhood. Therefore, the decision to design a new
development on the expanded site at the exclusion of ODNA came with a consequence.
ODNA's trust in the process was compromised and they were more vigilant and cautious
in their communication with Atlas and the BRA. In a way, ODNA's lack of information
pushed them to be even more persistent and demanding. For example, ODNA continued
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to influence window design and building materials after all necessary approvals had been
secured by making additional arrangements with Atlas outside of the process' 0.
With respect to institutional support, the South End neighborhood had a unique
advantage compared to other neighborhoods in that the South End had established
relationships the BRA through Lathrop and the mayor through the task force. In this
regard, the level of institutional support for the South End was substantial. However,
ODNA's interaction with Atlas and the BRA brought to the surface the boundaries of
institutional support. Specifically, ODNA members struggled with the role that Lathrop
played and their expectations of Lathrop. While many recognized Lathrop's effort to
support the neighborhood, it became apparent that Lathrop's BRA duties constrained her
from fully meeting the neighborhood's needs. For example, Lathrop's efforts to move
along the negotiation of project changes may have been interpreted by ODNA as
advocating for the developer's interests over ODNA. In this instance, it seems that
neighborhoods liken institutional support to neighborhood advocacy and ODNA
members may have expected Lathrop to advocate for the neighborhood more than
mediate disputes.
In addition, substantial institutional support still puts constraints on neighborhood
participation in the process. That is, despite the level of institutional support for ODNA
and the group's persistence, constant communication and monitoring of the process,
ODNA was still excluded from key events such as the design process and finalizing the
terms of mitigation. These instances reiterate that regardless of the level of institutional
support available, the city's process does not allow neighborhoods to be fully involved
and present in the process. Rather a neighborhood's level of influence is relegated to an
advisory role and a neighborhood's effectiveness is a function of its ability to convince
the BRA or developer to implement their demands.
108 As of June 2003, ODNA was still meeting with Atlas to finalize building materials for the project.
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Demands Changes
Use - Sell residential units as condos. - Majority of residents are condos.
Dimensions - Massing should not extend beyond - Height respects ODNA's demands with the
78, 38, 60, and 70 feet in different exception of 7-feet mechanical on top of
parts of project. roof.
- Housing reduced to 133 units.
Design - Light wells should be curved and - Light wells curved, expanded, and stepped
stepped back. back.
* Windows and light wells facing * Back of building redesigned and stepped
Laconia should be unobtrusive and back to minimize massiveness.
integrated with Laconia. e Courtyard landscape design changed to
e Courtyard designed with wide accommodate ODNA's demands.
opening and landscaping is treated - Laconia courtyard wall and driveway
with seriousness, maintained and improvements.
does not obstruct light. - Consultation with ODNA and Laconia
- Garage entrance roof, entrances, Trustees on light well and roof design near
and traffic conditions should be Laconia.
resolved. - Introduce second light well facing Laconia.
e Townhouse structure on Fay St. is at
least 32 ft from City Lights building.
e No balconies at end of Fay Street
structure facing west.
Affordable - No changes demanded. - No changes occurred.
Housing
Mitigation - A pedestrian bridge created over Fay * Improvement to Fay St and fence.
Street. - New construction of utilities, sidewalks, and
- Encourage small neighborhood street lighting.
businesses for retail space. - Contributions to Peters Park.
- First floor fire door of City Lights - Improvements to Laconia Artists' Gallery.
should be addressed. * Emergency egress at rear west door of City
* Pocket park behind New Boston Lights.
development should be retained. * Parking rights for abutters.
- Mitigation of all major impacts must - Underwrite central air condition units for
be agreed by ODNA prior to City Lights.
construction. - New skylight for City Lights.
-Neighborhood demands were based on a comment letter submitted by ODNA on May 22, 2002 in response to the
PNF. The project changes are based on project details in the Project Notification Form (PNF) and the Cooperation
Agreement of February 13, 2002 for Dover Residences.
Table 4. Overview of ODNA demands and project changes to Dover Residences. Additional demands
that were made in other forums such as at public meetings are not included in this table.
Conclusion
The Dover Residences project began as a cooperative process that operated according to
a process recommended by Lathrop. However, with no clear structure to the collaboration
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nor a collective understanding of each party's expectations, Dover Residences represents
a project that met the needs of the developer, city and neighborhood but through a
process that highlighted the limited role that neighborhoods have in influencing a project.
That is, Dover Residences incorporated the vast majority of ODNA's demands on design,
dimensions, and mitigation. However, the process reveals that despite the degree of
neighborhood unity in and institutional support for a neighborhood, the neighborhood
retains only advisory power in the process. Therefore, for private developments such as
Dover Residences, the thrust of a neighborhood's effort to effectuate large project
changes must be channeled through its advisory power to convince and persuade the
BRA and developer. At the same time, the neighborhood still needs to monitor the
process closely, and maintain constant communication with the developer and BRA.
ODNA had realized this on some level when it persisted in having Atlas continue to
consult with ODNA about project details after the development approval process ended.
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Chapter 5: Battery Wharf
The North End Neighborhood
The North End is one of the oldest neighborhoods in the United States. Historically an
immigrant and working-class community, the ethnic and socio-economic character of the
neighborhood shifted in the 1990s as the number young professionals and empty-nesters
moving into the neighborhood increased. As a result, a growing number of long-time
residents left the neighborhood because they could no longer afford the cost of living in
the neighborhood.
The North End is densely populated and bounded by Interstate 93 (1-93) which was
constructed in the 1950s and contained the area of the North End to the waterfront.
Construction impacts from the Central Artery Tunnel 09 have generated severe air, dust,
and noise pollution since the mid 1990s. Few developable parcels of land remain in the
neighborhood and most redevelopments projects have been on a small-scale.
Two neighborhood groups, the North End Neighborhood Council and the North End
Waterfront Resident Association (NEWRA), have represented the North End around
issues of development. Like the Chinatown Resident Association, NEWRA was formed
in reaction to the organizational structure of the neighborhood council. NEWRA" 0 was
established as an alternative resident group that operates according to an open process
and ensures that all members maintain a vote and voice in the group. In contrast, the
neighborhood council historically has held closed executive committee meetings prior to
a regular neighborhood council meeting. Residents have questioned the necessity of
having closed meetings and the nature of the discussions. In matters of development, the
city makes separate presentations to each group.
109 The Central Artery Tunnel project (CA/T) is a capital highway project funded by state and federal
monies. The project involves depressing the Boston portion of Interstate 93 underground. The land above
the newly-built tunnel has been designated as air rights parcels and a master planning process occurred to
develop the parcels according to neighborhood and public needs.
"10 NEYRA was founded by former Boston City Councilor and current Register Probate for Suffolk
County Richard Iannella. NEWRA operates according to membership and membership dues are minimal so
that any North End Resident can join and participate.
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The North End/Waterfront Neighborhood and Battery Wharf
Figure 4. Boundaries of the North End neighborhood and location of Battery Wharf.
In addition, North End's elected officials"', City Councilor Paul Scapicchio,
Representative Sal DiMasi, and State Senator Robert Travaglini have been highly
responsive to resident concerns. In the past, they have played an influential and active
role in advocating development according to resident demands.
Project Description
Battery Wharf is a mixed use development that Raymond Properties submitted to the
BRA in April 1996. According to the PNF, the original proposal was a 341,300 square
foot commercial and housing development standing at 54 feet 1 2 or 4 stories and a floor
"1 All three officials maintain deep ties to the neighborhood. Scapicchio and Travaglini grew up in the
neighborhood and Scapicchio was on the neighborhood council prior to being elected to city council.
112 The BRA defines project height to be the highest occupied space in a proposed project. Therefore
parapets and mechanicals that can extend many feet higher would not be calculated into the general
"height". The mechanicals for Battery Wharf increased the gross height to be above the zoning allowance
of 55 feet.
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area ratio (FAR) at less than 2 on a site area of 199,800 square feet. The total floor area
included 345 new parking spaces, 247,000 square feet of residential space, 74,300 square
feet of commercial space, and 74,000 square feet of retail space to accommodate a two-
story regional chain supermarket.
The site is located along Commercial Street, a popular arterial for commuters who want
to bypass downtown traffic en route to Interstate 93. Commercial Street also supports
local businesses, restaurants, and multi-unit residences. The site is flanked by Burroughs
Wharf, a condominium structure, and the US Coast Guard Pier. Figure 4 illustrates the
location of the project site relative to the neighborhood.
Surrounded by a public waterway, the site falls under Massachusetts General Law
Chapter 91113 which stipulates that waterfront development must provide public access to
the water and the Municipal Harbor Plan'4 which sets guidelines for development on
Boston's waterfront. In addition, the project must comply with Article 42A of the Boston
Zoning Code whereby height is restricted to 55 feet and FAR at 3.0. Furthermore, Battery
Wharf is in the North End Housing Priority Overlay Area which strongly encourages
housing in the area and in the Restricted Parking District of Boston which forbids off-
street parking for non-residential uses unless a conditional use permit is issued by the
Zoning Board of Appeals. The Battery Wharf proposal also requires conditional
variances for recreational open space, general retail, and parking uses. Lastly, the project
is subject to the conditions set by the Boston Conservation Commission" 5 which protects
the state's wetlands.
Jim English of Raymond Properties first introduced Battery Wharf to the North End
neighborhood at a public meeting on November 19, 1997, over 18 months after the PNF
was submitted. The project then underwent a DPIR review and in May 1998 the BRA
Board by unanimous vote issued final approval and waived further review under Article
80. By early 2000 the Battery Wharf project received the necessary licenses and permits
to begin construction. Raymond signed a cooperation agreement outlining the mitigation
113 Chapter 91 regulates activities on coastal and inland waterways in the State of Massachusetts.
114 The plan was created by the City of Boston and approved by the Executive Office of Environmental
Affairs to guide waterfront development in the city.
115 The Boston Conservation Commission administers the Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act
(M.G.L.c131s.40) in the City of Boston.
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plan and benefits for Battery Wharf on March 30, 2000. Later, in August 2000, Raymond
Properties sold the entire project to Harold Theran of Development Management
Corporation. Theran committed the following year to modifying the hotel and residential
uses to luxury standards and in September 2001 the changes were submitted to a number
of state and city agencies for approval. Shortly thereafter, September 11, 2001 occurred
and prevented hotel operators from securing financing for construction. As of late 2003,
the Battery Wharf project remains undeveloped. Appendix A includes a timeline of
events regarding the Battery Wharf development process.
Neighborhood Organization, Unity, and Approach to the Process
According to the PNF, Raymond had already met with and introduced the project to
elected officials and the "North End Neighborhood Waterfront Council"'1 6 . This suggests
that prior to the PNF, some people in the neighborhood were already aware of the project.
At the November 1997 meeting more than 300 residents and business owners from the
neighborhood attended to learn about the project for the first time. Many attendees were
concerned with the supermarket use, scale, and height of the project. The design of the
roof and mechanicals put the gross height at 20 feet over the height limit. Also, many
residents felt that the supermarket was an inappropriate use of waterfront land. NEWRA
president Richard lannella publicly expressed his intention to change the project. Another
resident, Dave Kubiak who had been living in the neighborhood for over 15 years,
relayed grave concerns with the uses proposed.
The week following the Battery Wharf presentation, residents and business owners began
to organize at a North End Waterfront Resident Association (NEWRA) meeting chaired
by Iannella. Enough opposition to the project existed, particularly to the supermarket and
lack of public access 1 7 , to create the Battery Wharf (Development) Working Group
hereafter referred as BWWG. BWWG was predominantly made up of NEWRA members
but saw itself as independent from NEWRA.
BWWG was a core of at least 25 people who had attended meetings consistently. The
majority did not have school-aged children living at home which made it easier to carve
116 The PNF for Battery Wharf, Section 5.
117 The design of the project would obstruct the view with a big block supermarket along Commercial
Street. Business owners saw the supermarket as a negative impact and threat to local businesses.
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out time for BWWG. The group included North End residents, waterfront residents,
business representatives, and abutters to the project. The waterfront residents consisted of
residents who lived in nearby Burroughs and Lincoln wharves. North End residents
included long-time North Enders who grew up in the neighborhood as well as newer
residents. The group proved to be a fairly knowledgeable body and included lawyers,
educators, institutional administrators, architects, people familiar with affordable housing,
and an environmental engineer. Some business owners were also involved. Residents
Joyce Curll who had a background in urban planning and Dave Kubiak who was an
environmental engineer interpreted the technical language.
BWWG divided itself into subcommittees wherein some members sat on more than one
committee. The subcommittees included but were not limited to Affordable Housing,
Hotel and Supermarket, Pedestrian Visual Access, Zoning/Licensing/Construction,
Traffic and Infrastructure, Government Public Relations, and Liaison to Raymond
Properties. Each subcommittee determined a chairperson who updated other chairpersons
of their findings. The chairpersons would strategize and discuss realistic outcomes for the
site and demands from Raymond. The chairpersons then went back to their respective
subcommittees to relay the discussion and address further issues raised by individuals in
the subcommittee. Decisions were made according to consensus and issues were
discussed before BWWG formulated its position on the project.
The determination and commitment of the BWWG was unrelenting. Most BWWG
members had office jobs and the resources to communicate with others via phone,
computer, email, and fax. Many shared information through memos, nightly phone
communication, and by word-of-mouth. Some members attended more than 50 meetings
related to the Battery Wharf project during the two year approval process. In addition,
BWWG established relationships with groups outside of the neighborhood such as a
Beacon Hill neighborhood group, the Alliance of Boston Neighborhoods (ABN), Save
the Harbor Save the Bay, the Boston Harbor Association, and the Conservation Law
Foundation (CLF). These groups added to the force of opposition.
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There were two main divisions between residents in the neighborhood. First, the attitude
118of waterfront residents towards Battery Wharf differed from the other residents' .
Waterfront residents tended to be high-income homeowners and saw Battery Wharf as an
opportunity to increase their property value. Therefore, luxury uses such as a five-star
hotel were seen as a boon to the neighborhood and many did not get involved in or take
issue with the use. In contrast, non-waterfront residents believed that Battery Wharf
would increase the influx of wealthier outsiders at the expense of long-time residents who
could not afford to live in the neighborhood because of the rising cost of living. Despite
these fundamental differences, there were waterfront residents like Fran Clay"19 who
agreed with the majority of North End residents and became actively involved in BWWG.
In addition, Clay was a trustee of Burroughs Wharf and was instrumental in involving the
Board of Trustees of Burroughs Wharf in the public process. Abutters to a project, such
as Burroughs Wharf to Battery Wharf, are given higher consideration in the development
process than a neighborhood resident.
Second, the supermarket proposal received mixed reviews. Some residents supported the
supermarket regardless of its location because the neighborhood was in dire need of one.
However, those who supported the supermarket were less vocal and did not get involved
with BWWG. With no organized dissent against BWWG's demands, BWWG became the
voice that the BRA and developer needed to address.
Tactics Used to Gain Institutional Support
BWWG's process, knowledge base, and unity provided a basis for carrying out specific
tactics to affect the project. BWWG's own process of project review allowed the group to
point out discrepancies in project design and regulations. Meanwhile their knowledge
base allowed them to scrutinize over the technical language and intent of public
documents. BWWG's unity created a voice for the neighborhood which the developer
and city were forced to address. The main tactics that BWWG employed included
enlisting political support, using the process, building allies, and engaging the media.
118 Commercial Street was the geographical line that divided the two groups.
119 From personal communication with Fran Clay, interview June 23, 2003.
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The North End's elected officials also exercised their influence in the development of the
neighborhood. BWWG involved City Councilor Scapicchio, Representative Sal DiMasi,
and Senator Travaglini from the beginning and the officials were given regular project
updates. Councilor Scapicchio took on the issue of affordable housing and arranged to
work closely with Raymond to determine an appropriate affordable housing package.
The impact of elected officials attending public meetings and speaking out against the
project was greater than if the neighborhood were challenging the project alone. The
officials worked in the city and state system and therefore were more familiar with the
intricacies of the process. In this respect they could get information from the BRA and
other regulatory agencies more readily than BWWG and relay the information back to the
neighborhood. In addition, the elected officials helped attract media attention and
increase public awareness of the project. The media attention along with elected officials'
public announcements that the city needed to address the neighborhood's concerns
exerted pressure on the BRA to resolve issues of the project. Furthermore, an elected
official can arrange to work out details of a project directly with a developer and on
behalf of the neighborhood, just as Scapicchio did with the affordable housing agreement.
BWWG used the process to challenge the process. The project was closely monitored and
persistent communication with the developer, the BRA, the conservation commission and
other government agencies was maintained to ensure that the agencies were aware of
BWWG. Members of BWWG made themselves visible by attending Battery Wharf-
related public events and testifying at hearings. One issue that BWWG raised publicly
was the poor process by which the Battery Wharf development proposal was created and
approved. For example, at the November 1997 meeting, Raymond agreed to establish a
community working group to help formulate the Draft Environmental Impact Report
(DEIR) before it was submitted to the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Agency
(MEPA). Many residents signed up to be part of the working group but no one was
contacted. Numerous comment letter to the DPIR and DEIR attest that the residents first
learned about the submission of the DEIR on January 26, 1998, less than two weeks
before the public comment deadline of February 9, 1998. Residents immediately
contacted Representative DiMasi who had been in direct contact with the developer only
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to learn that he too had been told the document had not been submitted1 2 0 . BWWG
mobilized to get the comment deadline extended so that the neighborhood could
adequately respond to the document. This incident caused BWWG to question the
trustworthiness of the developer and solidified BWWG's opposition to the project.
At the public meeting of February 23, 1998 which included attendance of MEPA
representative RJ Lyman and several legislators, BWWG members again publicly
challenged the process and how it led to a project that many residents oppose. Hundreds
of people from the neighborhood were in attendance and over 50 personal letters were
submitted to MEPA regarding the process following the meeting. An overwhelming
number of the people, including City Councilor Scapicchio, took issue with the general
scope of Battery Wharf and many asked for an extension of the public comment deadline,
which did occur.
In addition to the process, BWWG used Chapter 91, Environmental Impact Reports, the
Boston Conservation Commission, and the Municipal Harbor Plan to challenge the
environmental impacts of the project and its noncompliance with government regulations.
NEWRA sent a letter to the Executive Office and Environmental Affairs asking that an
amendment regarding community involvement in the review and public hearingm be
added to the Municipal Harbor Plan to ensure adequate public participation. Inquiries into
different agencies brought to the surface conflicting state and city agency views in
regards to the supermarket. The Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA)
which issues Chapter 91 licenses supported the supermarket and determined that it
effectively fulfilled Chapter 91's public accommodation stipulation. Meanwhile, the city
supported BWWG's position that while a supermarket was needed, the waterfront was
not an appropriate place to locate one. The site was not easily accessible by public
transportation and would increase traffic along an already congested Commercial Street.
In parallel with challenging the process, BWWG exercised a number of outreach methods
to inform the neighborhood of Battery Wharf. Word-of-mouth, project updates at regular
120 Various public comment letters to Trudy Coxe, Secretary, Executive Office of Environmental Affairs,
were submitted in February 1998.
121 Letter by Phyllis Rugnetta to Jan Reitsma (Deputy Secretary of the EOEA) on December 3, 1998.
m A supermarket is planned on Central Artery Tunnel Air Rights in the North End.
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NEWRA meetings, and two to three BWWG-sponsored public meetings were held to
inform residents when changes occurred with the project plan. At the BWWG public
meetings, a combination of the developer, elected officials, and BRA representatives
were invited. These representatives were asked to address neighborhood and working
group concerns in a question and answer format. At one meeting, BWWG gave the
developer a list of questions in advance so that their questions could be adequately
answered in a public forum. Sometimes the press attended meetings and public
attendance included members of the neighborhood who were not affiliated with NEWRA
or BWWG. BWWG also submitted comment letters and mobilized residents to write
individual letters expressing their concerns with the project. A one-page double-sided fact
sheet called "Battery Wharf Project - A Neighborhood Call to Action: Guide to writing
and calling elected officials" was also distributed in the neighborhood. In addition, a
standard form letter was drafted and distributed to residents as a substitute to a personal
letter if people wanted to help but did not have the time to write a letter. In the end,
BWWG created its own public process for the neighborhood such that few North End
residents did not know about the Battery Wharf project.
All the outside groups with which BWWG established relationships submitted comments
opposing Battery Wharf. Some groups shared BWWG's concerns regarding the negative
impacts that the project would impose. For example, the director of the Boston Harbor
Association actively participated in the public process to minimize Battery Wharf's
effects on the city's harbor front.
Throughout the process BWWG engaged the press which magnified public awareness of
the project. The conflicting positions of the state, city, BWWG and elected officials
appealed to the press. Each time BWWG formed a position on the progress of Battery
Wharf, the press was contacted. Articles were written in the neighborhood paper as well
as the Boston Globe123 . Channel 5 aired a story on Battery Wharf and revealed a
perspective of the site from Burroughs Wharf to illustrate the project's impacts on the
area.
123 Hurley, Mary, Residents Object to $100m Plan. Boston Sunday Globe City Weekly, 1 March 1998.
Ebbert, Stephanie, North Enders Voice Worries about Battery Wharf Plan. Boston Globe Section C, 24
February 1998.
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A combination of political and neighborhood pressure, opposition from BWWG's allies,
and negative press coverage forced the BRA and city to pay attention to BWWG. During
the development process, the BRA underwent staff changes whose support for the
neighborhood varied 124. Then BRA director Tom O'Brien appeared most receptive to the
residents' concerns. He attended a number of public meetings and had easy access to the
comment letters regarding Battery Wharf. The overriding issue during the comment
period which lasted six to eight months appeared to be the supermarket. Personal
communication with English of Raymond Properties and BWWG members suggest that
O'Brien played a central role in eliminating the supermarket12 .
After the elimination of the supermarket, opposition to Battery Wharf shifted. The
political backing for BWWG diminished when Travaglini and Iannella wrote letters
126supporting the project . Scapicchio worked with English on finalizing an affordable
housing agreement but did not inform BWWG of the arrangement. In addition, the Board
of Trustees of Burrough's Wharf and abutter to Battery Wharf submitted a letter
supporting Battery Wharf when motor vehicle access to the site was moved away from
Burrough's Wharf' 27. The BRA may have felt that the absence of abutter opposition and
decreased political backing after the elimination of the supermarket was significant
enough that the agency no longer needed to be as responsive to BWWG's concerns. Soon
after a Chapter 91 license and conditional use variances for housing and hotel uses were
issued. In addition, the project met the conditions set by the Boston Conservation
Commission and gained unanimous approval from the BRA board. In March 1999, the
BRA filed a document that waived Battery Wharf from further review under Article 80.
These events occurred with minimal changes to the project after the supermarket issue
was resolved.
124 At the beginning Ed O'Donnell and Richard Mulligan managed the approval process. After Battery
Wharf received BRA board approval, Susan Hannon replaced the BRA project team and worked primarily
with Harold Theran. In 2002, David Hanifin replaced Hannon as project manager for Battery Wharf.
m An interview with Jim English reveals that the BRA made it clear that a component of the project mix
had to be eliminated and the supermarket made the most sense. Interviews with Dave Kubiak and Fran
Clay of BWWG confirm that O'Brien was supportive of the neighborhood more than any other BRA
representative. In late 1999 O'Brien resigned from the BRA.
126 Letter from lannella to the BRA on April 23, 1998. Letter from Traviglini to BRA Director O'Brien on
May 7, 1998.
127 Letter from Barry Liner (Chairperson of Board of Trustees of Burrough's Wharf) to the BRA on April
22, 1998.
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Neighborhood Demands
BWWG's demands were explicitly outlined in its 14-page comment letter on the Draft
Environmental Impact Review (DEIR) and Draft Project Impact Report (DPIR)
submitted in late February 1998. The letter stipulated that a revised plan for the site must
be included in a Supplemental DEIR and was signed by the North End/Waterfront
Neighborhood Council, NEWRA, and the North End Battery Wharf Work Group
(BWWG). That the neighborhood council and residents association signed the letter
affirms that the neighborhood was united in their opposition to the project. Additional
demands and concerns may have been conveyed in other forms such as public
testimonies and through the media. However they are not included in the summary of
concerns described below.
1. Community Review: Public notification was insufficient and did not conform to
the regulations. The neighborhood must be an integral part of the development
and review process and concerns must be factored into the scope and
configuration of the final plan.
2. Housing: The project is in a Housing Priority Overlay Area. However the density
of the housing is too low and there are not enough housing units for the amount of
land that the housing occupies. Only 140 expensive housing will be provided for
approximately half the area of the entire project while affordable housing is what
the neighborhood really needs.
3. Affordable Housing: A $900,000 contribution to an affordable housing pot of
money does not sufficiently compensate for the housing needs of the North End
which need actual housing units to be built.
4. Hotel and Supermarket: Both the hotel and supermarket are not uses intended in
Municipal Harbor Plan. Twenty-four hour hotel activity would be disruptive and
not in line with community activity.
5. Open Space and Public Access: The U-shaped structure that fronts Commercial
Street turns its back on the North End community. Standing seven stories high,
the building obstructs public view to the waterfront and public access to the
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waterfront is restrictive. One must go through hotel and parking before accessing
the waterfront.
6. Building Height and Massing: A 16-foot high pitched roof means that the
building height is above the 55-foot height limit. Dormers are added to the roof of
each building which protrudes to nearly two-thirds of the building width at ground
level. The massing makes buildings "appear enormous" from almost every visual
angle. The building along Commercial Street is actually 7-stories and not the
stated 6-stories. The supermarket is two-stories in height. The buildings along the
pier create long continuous walls against water and do not follow the urban design
guidelines in Article 42A-8.2f of the Boston Zoning Code. Air quality may
worsen as a result of the height and design of the Commercial Street building.
7. Shadow: The height and configuration of buildings limit sunlight in open space
areas and access corridors. The shadow impact would be 20% less if buildings
adhered to height restriction.
8. Transportation/Traffic Impacts and Parking: The project will worsen traffic with
a net increase in demand-to-supply ratio for parking spaces. More in-depth traffic
studies need to be provided and public safety issues need to be addressed to
adequately assess the effects of the project. Commercial Street in its current
condition cannot support the proposed project. A supplemental DEIR should
address these issues. Vehicle trips and parking needs are much greater than stated
in DEIR. Commercial Street serves many purposes (e.g. local and pass-through
traffic to avoid Central Artery construction). In sum, parking need, the Level of
Service (LOS) and associated air quality need to be reevaluated to address
neighborhood issues raised.
9. Construction Impacts: The report lacks description of the anticipated construction
impacts or the cumulative construction impacts from Central Artery project and
other major construction in the area. The hours of construction are misleading and
need to be clarified. There is no mention of how traffic will be addressed when
construction vehicles will obstruct the traffic on Commercial Street. There is no
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estimate of the total number of parking spaces lost during construction and nor
what compensation will be provided for the temporary loss.
Project Changes
Project changes were confirmed in a letter from Raymond to BRA Director Tom O'Brien
on April 21, 1998 and incorporated in the cooperation agreement signed in May 1999.
The mitigation and benefits plan is briefly outlined below 28
1. Building Height: Flat-roofed buildings at a total height of 55 feet would be
incorporated and in accordance with the allowable zoning.
2. Pedestrian/Visual Access: The Commercial Street building would be split to
create visual and physical access to water's edge as well as draw the public to
water. Public accommodation facilities would be provided.
3. Traffic/Access: Private vehicle access would be shifted away from Battery Street
and be located closer to the building abutting the Coast Guard station.
4. Supermarket/Retail: No supermarket or "chain" store use will occur on the site.
The developer will communicate with local retailers and retailers interested in the
site. Health fitness and a spa facility would be pursued.
5. Affordable Housing: A 1.5 million dollar contribution to create affordable
dwelling units off-site would be provided.
6. Hotel: Taxi stands will be located inside property. No large meeting or function
room will occur in the hotel. Community meeting room should be made available
for community activities. First floor design should be inviting to the public and
public amenities should be available. No car rental agencies will be on site. Hotel
rooms will be limited under Chapter 91. No live entertainment or dance floor will
be built in the restaurant or lounge.
7. Parking and other neighborhood concerns: Compensatory parking will be
provided for all spaces lost. Sufficient on-site parking will be available to
accommodate the project's parking demand. Implementation of a parking
128 NEWRA letter to James English of Raymond Properties on May 18, 1998.
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management plan for the garage will be made to maximize the availability of
spaces to North End residents at a reasonable cost. Adequate trees and
landscaping will occur in the general area outside the development site.
It is worth noting that after project ownership was transferred from Raymond to Harold
Theran of Development Management Corporation in 2000, changes were made to the
project 129. However, because of complicated circumstances behind the changes, the
changes are not discussed in this chapter.
Evaluating Project Outcome
As illustrated in Table 5, the project changes that occurred compared to BWWG's
demands indicates that significant changes occurred in use and design. BWWG's most
notable success was the elimination of the supermarket. The supermarket was the core
issue that motivated people from the North End to form BWWG. Immense pressure to
eliminate the supermarket was exerted from both inside and outside the neighborhood,
from elected officials to the BRA, that Raymond had little choice but to replace the use
with another use.
Other than eliminating the supermarket, Raymond addressed BWWG's concerns about
hotel and traffic impacts through design changes. Raymond agreed to limit activities such
as no live entertainment or car rental agencies on hotel grounds to minimize adverse
effects. Eventually after many efforts to replace the hotel with other uses, BWWG
conceded that other uses were economically infeasible. A review of Table 5 indicates that
Raymond also made a concerted effort to fulfill the parking needs expressed by BWWG
and mitigate the traffic pattern onto the site. This may have contributed to Burrough's
Wharf support of the project which occurred shortly after the supermarket was removed.
129 According to a letter dated September 18, 2001 from Theran's legal representative to DEP waterways
regulation program, the modifications included replacing 271 square feet of interior public space with
landscaping and eliminating a second floor viewing area that was deemed non-functional. Although not
mentioned in the letter, Theran's changes include an additional 7-foot parapet designed above the 55 feet
height limit which would cause the building to stand at least 62 feet out towards the water's edge.
130 While BWWG was aware of the changes and attempted to challenge the modifications, the group found
it difficult to mobilize when there was no financing for the hotel and the project had already received final
approval from the city and state.
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Demands Changes
Use * No supermarket. - No supermarket or "chain" store will occur.
- No hotel - Contact local retailers and other retailers
interested in site.
- Health fitness and spa facility would be
pursued.
Dimensions - Build according to 55 feet height limit. - Height reduced to 55 feet.
- Increase the density of housing with * The number of hotel rooms will be limited.
more affordable housing.
Design - Roof should be redesigned to - A flat roof design will replace the pitched
conform to zoning. roof design to conform to zoning.
- Massing of building should not make - Commercial Street building will be split to
buildings look enormous. create visual and physical access to water.
- Commercial St. building should not - First floor design will be inviting to public
obstruct public view of waterfront. and provide public amenities.
- Create non-restrictive public access To minimize hotel activity:
to waterfront. -Taxi stands will be located inside property.
- Project should follow urban design -No large meeting or function room in hotel.
guidelines in Boston Zoning Code. -Community meeting room will be made
available for community activities.
-No car rental agencies will be on site.
-No live entertainment or dance floor to be
built in restaurant or lounge.
Affordable - Build affordable housing in the North - 1.5 million dollar contribution for affordable
Housing End instead of a contribution. housing.
Mitigation - A revised plan for the site to be - Adequate trees and landscaping to occur in
submitted in Supplemental DEIR. general area outside development site.
e Sunlight in open space areas and - Private vehicle access shifted away from
access corridors to be maximized. Battery Street to near Coast Guard station.
- More in-depth traffic studies and e Compensatory parking will be provided for
public safety information must be all spaces lost.
provided. - On-site parking will be available to
e A re-evaluation of parking need, LOS, accommodate project's parking demand.
and associated air quality is needed - Parking management plan to be
to address neighborhood concerns. implemented and maximize availability of
- More info on the construction impacts spaces to North End.
from the project and cumulative
effects from the Central Artery Proj.
Neighborhood demands are drawn from a 14-page comment letter submitted by BWWG in response to the DPIR and DEIR
in February 1998.Project changes are based on project details in the PNF, the BRA Board Memorandum of May 21, 1998
and the Cooperation Agreement of March 30, 2000.
Table 5. An overview of BWWG demands and project changes for Battery Wharf. Additional neighborhood demands that
may have been made in other forums such as at public meetings are not included in this table. Project changes occurred after
final approval of Battery Wharf and transfer of ownership. However, in order to maintain consistency between the three case
studies, they are not included above.
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The affordable housing arrangement was perhaps the least successful outcome of the
project. Initial efforts were made to build affordable off-site131 units in the North End but
they did not materialize. When Councilor Scapicchio offered to work with Raymond on
the affordable housing plan, BWWG put their trust in the Councilor's ability to come up
with a suitable plan. However, Scapicchio's role in negotiating the affordable housing
agreement was ambiguous and was not formally relayed to BWWG. Therefore, members
of BWWG and the North End neighborhood are unclear about the final arrangements,
though they understand that the affordable housing will not be built in the North End
which did not meet their demands 132. The affordable housing situation continues to be a
point of tension with BWWG.
The manner in which the changes occurred exemplifies how the level of neighborhood
unity and institutional support contributed to realizing them. The elimination of the
supermarket appeared to be the turning point in the process. From the outset, the
supermarket was the central issue that drew together people in the neighborhood, outside
organizations, elected officials, and the media. The BRA needed to address this force of
opposition and BRA director Tom O'Brien assumed the role. Public reactions to and
BWWG organizing around Battery Wharf shaped O'Brien's understanding that much of
the opposition hinged on the supermarket and that the project could move forward if the
use were replaced. Personal communication with English indicates that Raymond felt
pressure from many sides, including the BRA, to remove the supermarket.
Neighborhood unity and institutional support from O'Brien diminished significantly
when Iannella's position shift from complete opposition to support and Travaglini's
support for the project occurred. BWWG intertwined other issues such as affordable
housing with the supermarket, more substantial changes could have occurred. Even so,
the creation and institution of a neighborhood process to review the project was an
131 One iteration of the Battery Wharf affordable housing plan was to build affordable units on a nearby site
occupied by the Knights of Columbus and construct community space dedicated to the Knights. However,
the Knights rejected the proposal.
132 BWWG members also saw a discrepancy in the city's treatment of affordable housing. Whereas 226
Causeway, another large-scale project impacting the North End, was required to incorporate affordable
housing on-site, Battery Wharf which would have far greater impacts on the neighborhood was approved
for off-site affordable housing despite resident opposition.
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effective organizing tool for BWWG to build a voice and compel the BRA and developer
to respond to, and on some level, support their demands.
Conclusion
BWWG's diverse knowledge base, process-oriented approach, participation in the
process, and ability to build a wide support network from politicians to outside
organizations led to the formation of one well organized and united voice against the
Battery Wharf project. While BWWG secured key changes in the use and design of the
project and were able to minimize construction, traffic and hotel impacts, more changes
may have been secured had they maintained their unity and political support throughout
the process. In this respect, the level of institutional support gained can be adversely
affected when neighborhood unity diminishes. In addition, as was the case with
affordable housing, the level of influence that an elected official exerts and his/her
responsiveness to an issue can be limited. A neighborhood needs to consider the
reliability of one's political support. The case of BWWG suggests that a neighborhood
group may be more effective in securing changes if they are present throughout the
negotiation process rather than relying on their supporters and advocates to be able to
adequately represent and address the neighborhood's demands.
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Chapter 6: A Comparative Analysis of Neighborhood Influence in
Effecting Project Changes
Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to compare project changes and the means in which
neighborhoods133 influenced the changes. The analysis begins with an evaluation of
project changes and points out noteworthy changes in the neighborhoods. The project
comparisons are then used to identify ways that the neighborhoods were able to build
unity and support around their demands. Lastly, lessons are extracted from the analysis to
inform neighborhoods of considerations that can increase their effectiveness in the
development process.
A Comparison of Project Changes
The project changes for each large development proposal varied in response to demands
made by neighborhood groups. FLP's demands and changes to Liberty Place centered on
reducing dimensions and increasing affordable housing. ODNA's demands and changes
to Dover Residences focused on design and mitigation measures to address abutters
concerns. BWWG's demands and Battery Wharf changes largely involved project use
and facilities of public accommodation. Table 6 summarizes the changes used to evaluate
the outcomes of the case studies.
Beginning with project use, Battery Wharf demanded and secured the most notable use
changes relative to Dover Residences and Liberty Place. For BWWG, elimination of the
supermarket took highest priority and was realized. However, changing the hotel to a
different use was a priority that did not occur. ODNA was the only other neighborhood
group that sought use modifications when it requested a strong preference for
condominiums over apartment rentals. However, relative to ODNA's other demands, the
question of ownership versus rental took low priority. Considering the lack of use
demands in Dover Residences and Liberty Place, and given that significant use changes
in Battery Wharf occurred with mixed results, it may be argued that BWWG was in fact
133 This thesis focuses on neighborhood groups that opposed or demanded significant changes to a project.
The groups therefore do not necessarily represent the neighborhood. Neighborhood groups that supported
the projects have been mentioned though not discussed in depth.
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less successful in affecting project uses to conform to their demands than neighborhood
groups that made minimal to no demands on use.
With respect to dimensional changes, Dover Residences experienced minimal changes
while Liberty Place and Battery Wharf underwent more significant changes. Height was
decreased in two cases. A reduction of 21.4% and 15 feet occurred for Battery Wharf and
complied with zoning. Liberty Place experienced the greatest height reduction at 39 feet
but was still approved over 2.5 times the zoning. This highlights a disparity in the size of
projects proposed relative to zoning in the downtown. Liberty Place was introduced to the
neighborhood with a height that exceeded 3 times the zoning while Dover Residences
134and Battery Wharf were introduced at less than 50% beyond the allowable zoning' . In
addition while general massing of Battery Wharf and Liberty Place was reduced in
response to neighborhood concerns, a proportionately higher reduction of 20% occurred
with Battery Wharf compared to Liberty Place at approximately 5%. Housing units
increased in Liberty Place while they decreased by 48% in Battery Wharf, which was a
significant loss for the North End. Interestingly, the North End and Chinatown both
experience traffic congestion throughout the day but they had opposing approaches to the
parking situation. While a decrease in parking was demanded but not fulfilled for Liberty
Place, more parking was demanded and occurred for BWWG.
Design changes were employed to address neighborhood concerns on traffic and to create
a more pedestrian-friendly presence in all three cases. In particular, motor vehicle access
to the sites was modified to minimize traffic impacts cited by all the neighborhoods. In
addition, the developers used design elements to enhance the projects' street presence and
create the feel of a smaller project. Deeper setbacks were incorporated in Liberty Place
and a major building was split into two smaller buildings to produce a public view
corridor for Battery Wharf. In the case of Dover Residences, not only was general project
massing influenced by the neighborhood but also fine details of the project such as the
shape of light wells to the angle and materials of a wall. The range of changes from motor
vehicles access the site to the selection of building materials suggests that design changes
134 This thesis however cannot conclusively say that this disparity is indicative of the general pattern of
development in the three neighborhoods. Further comparisons of additional developments in each
neighborhood would be necessary to determine such a pattern.
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can vary widely and is a function of who speaks for the impacted neighborhood(s). In the
case of Dover Residences, the abutters wielded more influence in the project than any
other neighborhood group in the South End. Subsequently many of the design changes
responded to abutters' concerns.
Affordable housing changes occurred in Liberty Place and Battery Wharf but were not an
135issue with Dover Residences . While the affordable housing allocation increased in
Liberty Place and Battery Wharf, the neighborhoods did not believe the compensation
adequately offset project impacts. For Liberty Place, 66 out of 439 units accounts for
15% of the total project. However, the number of affordable units decreased from 70
units in the DPIR to 66 units at final approval due to the change in massing. In this regard,
the 15% did not meet FLP's demand for an increase in affordable housing proportional to
the zoning relief sought.
For Battery Wharf, a contribution of 1.5 million dollars towards the construction of off-
site affordable housing was negotiated with the city despite BWWG's efforts to secure
on-site affordable housing. Both Chinatown and the North End have few developable
parcels of land and without a clear commitment from the city or developer that off-site
affordable housing would be built in the neighborhood, the affordable housing
contributions would likely go to another part of the city. For this reason, Battery Wharf
was seen as a valuable opportunity to build much needed affordable housing in the
neighborhood and the final agreement by the city and Raymond to provide off-site
compensation was a major point of contention for BWWG.
In the area of off-site mitigation, the North End was provided with minimal mitigation
while the South End received project-related improvements and Chinatown's mitigation
package was awarded through a lawsuit that abutters filed against the city and its zoning
process. BWWG's focus on shaping the actual project rather than seeking off-site
compensation is evident in that temporary parking during construction was the main
mitigation measure for the North End.
The terms of mitigation in Chinatown were unique in that they resulted from a lawsuit
filed against the city after the "process" was completed and all approvals had been
135 Dover Residences was proposed with the requisite 10% affordable housing on-site.
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secured. The settlement exceeded neighborhood demands by providing additional
housing targeting Chinatown residents and giving residents status equal to the
neighborhood council which the residents had been demanding for years. In addition,
institutional support was secured through the city's commitment to work with residents to
determine the implementation of a development plan based on the Chinatown master
plans. While these mitigation terms were the most significant victories for FLP and
residents, they fell outside the physical boundaries of Liberty Place. With the exception
of abutter relocation assistance, the mitigation did not address physical elements or
negative impacts directly connected with the project itself. In this respect, the lawsuit and
mitigation appear to be concessions offered by the city and developers' to ensure that
Liberty Place is built.
In contrast, the terms of mitigation for Dover Residences directly addressed abutters'
demands. Four out of the six terms benefit the abutting residents while the remaining two
measures were enhancements to the general neighborhood with improvements on Fay
Street and for a public park across the street from the project. The Fay Street
improvements were city demands and some residents felt that the improvements created
competition between the neighborhood and the city in determining appropriate mitigation
for the project. Still off-site improvements were parceled out to both parties during the
"process" and exceeded the terms of mitigation provided to Chinatown and the North
End. For example, the terms of mitigation for Dover Residences included ODNA's
approval on the final window and roof materials for the project. Meanwhile, Chinatown
and the North End struggle to get basic needs such as decent affordable housing, and
adequate air quality in the neighborhood.
An examination of changes that lessened negative impacts from the proposed projects
and addressed demands of the neighborhood groups reveal that ODNA in the South End
was most successful. Only one major demand, a pedestrian bridge, could not be
incorporated into the project. The bridge was proposed more to enhance pedestrian access
to the site rather than to alleviate the negative effects produced by the project. Design
elements such as roof design and light wells required ODNA consultation.
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Chinatown and the North End were less successful in influencing the projects according
to their demands. In the case of Liberty, there was a wide gap between the changes made
relative to FLP demands. In particular, FLP grounded their demands on compliance to
zoning and maximum affordable housing to address the neighborhood's housing needs.
While the city and developer made changes that included a 5% reduction in height and
massing, design modifications, and a 15% affordable housing allocation, the project was
still approved beyond the legal zoning and at less than the affordable housing demanded.
The approved project adds 373 units of new market-rate housing in conjunction with 66
affordable units in Chinatown. Of the 66 affordable units Chinatown residents will be
able to qualify for only 30 of the units 136. The remaining affordable units require tenants
that make 80%-120% of the area median income which is largely unaffordable for
Chinatown residents. The affordable housing picture illustrates the impacts that the
Chinatown neighborhood needs to absorb to gain 30 units of housing and still there is a
question of how many units will actually go to the neighborhood. With respect to
mitigation, the terms spoke to the larger issue of large-scale development in the
neighborhood and not just Liberty Place. In this sense the mitigation appears to be more a
way for the city and developer to ensure that Liberty Place gets built in the short-term and
address FLP's demands over time.
BWWG also struggled to get changes made and grounded their demands on Chapter 91
and zoning requirements. BWWG's main challenge was to effectuate an appropriate
public use and design that was accessible to the public and provided new affordable
housing in the neighborhood. While a hotel is an acceptable use of public accommodation
and an improvement over the supermarket, BWWG felt it was not an optimal public use
for the site. However, as a result of eliminating the supermarket, greater importance was
placed on the hotel as the primary form of public accommodation for the site.
Consequently, a significant number of housing units decreased to make way for the hotel.
In addition, each housing unit covers a fairly large area such that the total units planned
for the project were less than the average market-rate housing that could be built on-site.
136 The 30 units are composed of 10 government-subsidized units for tenants that make 50% or less of the
Area Median Income (AMI) and 20 units for elderly who make 60% of the AMI.
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Project Changes in Liberty Place, Dover Residences, and
Battery Wharf
Liberty Place Dover Residences Battery Wharf
Use ' No changes demanded. e Condos requested. Changed to condos - No supermarket or chain store
with some rental units. demanded and secured.
- No hotel demanded. Changed hotel
conditions to minimize activity on-site.
Dimensions e Demanded max height of 100 ft. - No changes demanded. Units decreased - Demanded and secured height
Height reduced (310 to 271 ft). (140 to 133). reduction (70 to 55 ft).
- Demanded units be reduced - Demanded unit increase. Units
according to capacity of zoning decreased (232 to 120)
envelope Units increased (430 to - Demanded and secured decreased
439). massing (465,000 to 370,000 SF).
e Demanded that massing comply with - No demand on retail space. Retail
zoning. Massing reduced (650,341 space decreased (148,300 to 42,500
to 617,824 SF) but not according to SF)
zoning. * Demanded and secured increased
e Demanded fewer parking spaces. parking spaces (345 to 376)
Parking spaces increased (468 to
471 spaces).
Design - No demands on design. Garage The following changes were demanded and * Demanded and secured private
entrance redesigned to minimize secured. vehicle access near US Coast Guard
traffic. e Redesigned garage entrances. instead of Battery Street.
- No demand on setbacks. Setbacks e Improved light well design. - Demanded design to encourage public
increased on Washington and Beach - Redesigned rear side of building. use of site. Building on Commercial
Streets. - Maximize natural light for abutters. Street split to better accommodate
- Courtyard wall improvements. public.
- Developer-maintained landscape and
driveway.
* Final consultation with ODNA and Laconia
for light wells and roof design.
- Incorporate second light well facing
Laconia.
Affordable e Demanded affordable housing - No changes demanded. - Demanded on-site affordable housing.
Housing proportionate to zoning relief sought. Instead a $1.5 million contributionHousing units increased (20 to 66) to for off-site affordable housing
15%. occurred.
Mitigation Following changes were mutually * City demanded and secured improvements - Demanded and secured
agreed between FLP, the city, and to Fay Street. compensatory parking during
developer. construction.
e City and developer contributions for The following changes were demanded and
permanently affordable units. secured.
- City will acquire or build housing in e Contributions to Peters Park.
two years. e Improvements to Laconia Artists' Gallery.
- CPA approval of new housing . Underwrite central air conditioning for
project. abutting residents.
- Developer will help abutter relocate. * New skylight for City Lights.
e Implement. of master plan with CPA * Parking Spaces available to Laconia Lofts
and CRA. and City Lights residents through a lottery.
- CRA authority equivalent to CNC.
Demands were derived from comment letters submitted to the BRA during the Article 80 process and may not include additional demands made in other arenas such
as at public meetings and newspaper articles. Changes were based on project details stated in the Notice of Project Change (NPC), minutes of BRA board approval for
Uberty Place, and the variances for Liberty Place. For Dover Residences, changes were based on modifications that occurred priorto submission of the Project
Notification Form (PNF) and the Cooperation Agreement. Battery Wharf changes were based on details listed in the PNF, a BRA Board Memorandum detailing the
project and the Cooperation Agreement for the project.
Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority
Table 6. Final project changes for Liberty Place, Dover Residences, and Battery Wharf.
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Effective Means of Building Neighborhood Unity
Neighborhood unity appears to be a core component of effectuating project changes.
There appears to be a positive association between neighborhood unity and the extent to
which each neighborhood influenced project changes. The South End was most
successful in securing project changes and maintained a united front throughout the
process and after final project approval. Meanwhile BWWG's opposition to Battery
Wharf began strong but lost force when the supermarket was eliminated and Iannella and
Travaglini publicly supported the project. Neither ODNA nor BWWG faced strong
opposing interests. In contrast, the Chinatown neighborhood was clearly divided from the
outset. Those who opposed and supported Liberty Place carried out parallel campaigns
which reinforced the differences in the neighborhood and prevented the city and
developer from formulating a resolution to the project. Clearly there are a number of
issues that can be extracted from the case studies and account for neighborhood unity.
However, for the purposes of this thesis, three elements of building unity are discussed in
depth to point out what enabled neighborhoods to successfully work together.
BWWG's creation and institution of its own review process in assessing Battery Wharf is
a mechanism that helped build and strengthen neighborhood unity. The group ensured
that the process was open and that its members followed its own process. In addition,
BWWG held the city and developer accountable to the process. This put the city,
developer, and neighborhood on equal grounding which was a key element that the city's
public review process lacked. The simple structure of BWWG's process allowed people
to participate in one or more subcommittees and take on assignments which were
determined collectively in the subcommittees. More importantly, the information
collected was organized through the chairpersons of each subcommittee and circulated
through various ways from phone conversations to faxes and emails. This caused
everyone to be on the same page. BWWG's clear structure and open process caused
people to feel invested because each person became one part of a whole team which was
essential to realizing their goal. In essence BWWG was about organizing members of the
neighborhood to research and develop a common agenda and set of demands which can
be a key component in building and maintaining unity.
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A neighborhood group's ability to separate individual benefits from the project's impact
on the neighborhood is another way to facilitate neighborhood unity. For example the
North End and South End did not compromise the goals of the neighborhood by
accepting select benefits that advanced one particular interest. In the case of ODNA, the
developer could have tried to divide residents in the two abutting buildings by providing
more benefits to one building over another. Though, this was not the case because ODNA
recognized from the outset that unity would lead to a better outcome than competing
against each other. In contrast, Hong Lok House which abutted Liberty Place was offered
substantial benefits that directly addressed Chinatown's elderly needs. In accepting the
offer, the group not only put its interests above the general interests of the neighborhood
but also enabled the developer to secure a committed source of neighborhood support.
This added to the controversy around Liberty Place and further divided the neighborhood.
The different actions taken by ODNA and Hong Lok House illustrate how unity can be a
function of the extent to which individual groups accept "the neighborhood" rather than
the occurrence of different interest groups serving as the main negotiating party for a
project.
Neighborhood unity is also a function of leadership. Leadership involves the ability to
bridge different interests into a common agenda and advance neighborhood concerns by
communicating effectively with different audiences such as the neighborhood, developers
and city representatives. The core issue with Liberty Place was its inability to bridge
interests. Although there was strong leadership by those who supported and opposed
Liberty Place, they carried out parallel campaigns that conflicted with each other. In this
regard even though both groups had a shared goal to do what is best for the neighborhood,
no one was able to bridge the issues into a common set of demands. Meanwhile both
ODNA and BWWG maintained strong leadership through open discussions and
determining demands collectively.
That BWWG reached out to a range of North Enders from long-time working class
residents to upper-income waterfront residents is telling of the collective leadership of the
group. Within BWWG, the leadership consisted of subcommittee chairpersons who were
responsible for determining a collective agenda and drafting comment letters as well as
informing the group and neighborhood of new findings and testifying at hearings. Several
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subcommittee chairpersons often took the initiative in drafting letters and testifying at
public meetings which not only established their leadership in the group but also with the
city and developer. To encourage openness and differences, BWWG outreached and
welcomed any neighborhood member to its meetings and was willing to discuss issues
with those who had opposing views. However, no other interests or groups conflicted
with BWWG's goals.
In the case of Dover Residences, Lathrop of the BRA determined who represented the
neighborhood by selecting ODNA to be the primary group with whom the developer
would work on the project. No neighborhood group challenged this arrangement which
strengthened ODNA's role in Dover Residences. Within ODNA, the president and vice-
president appeared to lead the group by monitoring the process and maintaining constant
communication between the city, developer, and abutters. This enabled abutting residents
to feel they were sufficiently updated on the situation and could stand firm on what was
acceptable and not acceptable about the project.
Effective Means of Gaining Institutional Support
There also appears to be a positive association between institutional support and the
extent to which a neighborhood influenced project changes. With respect to the South
End, Lathrop who is the planner for the South End set the conditions for development
approval whereby ODNA support was a condition of BRA approval. This essentially
meant that the development hinged on ODNA and the group could exercise significant
influence in shaping the project. ODNA's situation was unique in that Lathrop was both
an active neighborhood resident and in a position at the BRA that allowed the ODNA to
focus its efforts on the project itself. During the process, ODNA did not feel their unity
challenged nor feel threatened by potential loss of institutional support.
Meanwhile BWWG acquired the support of then BRA director O'Brien who personally
followed the process. O'Brien's role in the process was likely affected by BWWG's overt
opposition to the project, negative media attention, and the political backing of North
End's elected officials. The elected officials exerted pressure on the BRA and developer
by personally inquiring about the progress of the project. This sent the message that the
elected officials were invested in supporting BWWG's concerns. City Councilor
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Scapicchio offered to work out an appropriate affordable housing arrangement with the
developer to ensure that sufficient affordable housing occurred. Furthermore, the elected
officials attracted media attention more easily than if the neighborhood were going at the
project alone. In this regard enlisting political support is an efficient way to gain the
city's attention and can be an effective way to facilitate support from the city.
Both FLP and BWWG utilized a number of tactics that got the attention of the city. The
tactics included building a wide coalition of support from within and outside the
neighborhood, organizing a letter-writing campaign during the public comment periods,
testifying at public hearings, increasing public awareness and education about the project,
and engaging the media. FLP's public demonstrations against Liberty Place and
BWWG's constant correspondence with newspaper reporters got the attention of both the
BRA and mayor.
However, Liberty Place highlights that getting the attention of the BRA does not
necessarily lead to institutional support. FLP had little if any institutional support even
though they received much attention. The BRA played the role of mediator and assumed
the task of establishing a common ground between the developer and the conflicting
interest groups in the neighborhood. While the BRA empathized with the issues that FLP
raised, it did not directly support their demands and project changes were minimal
relative to the demands of FLP. The neighborhood divisions over Liberty Place actually
enabled the BRA to justify project approval by pointing to some level of neighborhood
support and the greater effect of diminishing adult entertainment for the neighborhood
and the general public. It was not until the lawsuit against the city that the BRA and the
mayor's office began to address FLP's concerns with affordable housing, the role of
residents' voice in development, and implementation of the Chinatown Master Plan.
Even then, the city was essentially forced to support FLP as a means of ensuring that
Liberty Place be built. In this regard, a lawsuit137 can be a powerful way to gain
institutional support if other measures fail.
137 A lawsuit presumes that there are legal grounds to sue and the neighborhood is aware of the costs and
risks involved.
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Lessons Learned
The outcomes of the three cases reveal that there is no one solution or set of ways to
ensure neighborhood influence in effectuating project changes in Boston. Instead, it is
more helpful to consider neighborhood influence as a function of unity in and
institutional support for a neighborhood. The experience of Liberty Place illustrates how
neighborhood divisions can prevent the city and developer from determining a project
that adequately addresses the collective interests of the neighborhood. In the end, the city
put aside the interests of the neighborhood in favor of diminishing adult entertainment
use in the area which the BRA felt would benefit the greater good of the city. Dover
Residences exemplifies the extent to which a neighborhood can shape a development
when both strong unity and institutional support exist.
Liberty Place and Dover Residences also highlight the influence that abutters have in the
eyes of the city and U.S. court system. In Liberty Place, it is interesting that abutters with
opposing views of the project were able to secure substantial mitigation from the
developer. This confirms that abutters are provided higher consideration and more input
power in shaping a project than other members of the public. In light of this, the inclusion
of abutters in determining a set of demands could significantly help neighborhoods wield
influence in a project.
In addition, it appears that neighborhoods will be more successful at getting their
demands met if they involve design changes and mitigation than if they organized around
dimensional changes and affordable housing. The degree of neighborhood resources
invested in decreasing height and modifying affordable housing was much greater than
the time and energy invested in ensuring design changes and mitigation. ODNA focused
most of its demands on design and mitigation of which the large majority were realized.
With Liberty Place, design changes were initiated by the developer to address FLP's
concerns with the scale and height of the project. Meanwhile BWWG found that
negotiating the elimination of the supermarket and sufficient affordable housing
significantly more difficult than moving the vehicle access point and splitting the
Commercial Street building.
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From these observations, it may be gleaned that neighborhoods can be more successful in
getting their demands met if they could translate negative dimensional impacts into terms
of mitigation or design changes. However, this tactic should be executed carefully. The
long-term impact of repeatedly allowing projects to violate dimensional requirements
and/or any other regulations could be misinterpreted by developers as a nod that any
project can be proposed in the neighborhood as long as sufficient mitigation and other
modifications are offered.
Mitigation can also be a mechanism used by the developer and/or city to divide interests
as was the case of Liberty Place. In this respect neighborhood groups would be better off
in the long run if they avoid accepting immediate benefits or mitigation and gain
collective agreement within the neighborhood body when negotiating a project. This
approach would also cause the city and developer to treat the neighborhood as a united
one which in turn influences the project changes that occur.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations
Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the questions posed in Chapter One and highlight
the lessons learned from the case studies. Then drawing from the analysis in Chapter 6
and the experiences of Chinatown, the South End, and the North End, recommendations
are made to inform Boston neighborhoods of ways in which they can effectuate project
changes in large-scale developments.
Summary
In determining how neighborhoods have influenced project changes, a comparison of
project changes in use, dimensions, design, affordable housing, and off-site mitigation in
Liberty Place, Dover Residences, and Battery Wharf reveal that a number of project
changes can occur in the course of a large project public review process. Although the
results from the three case studies may not be conclusive, it may be surmised that
changes in design and off-site mitigation can be more easily secured than changes in
dimensions, use, and affordable housing. Fewer changes were secured in the Liberty
Place and Battery Wharf projects where dimensional, use, and affordable housing
demands took priority than in Dover Residences where the neighborhood focused on
design and mitigation.
The participation of FLP, ODNA, and BWWG in the public review process confirms that
neighborhood groups can use a variety of tactics to realize changes to large projects in
downtown Boston. In deeply divided neighborhoods such as Chinatown, a combination
of a public campaign against the project and a lawsuit against the city effectively forced
the city to respond to specific concerns before the project could be constructed. In a
united neighborhood like the South End in the Dover Residences project, institutional
support from the BRA was established from years past and put the neighborhood in a
position to secure a wide range of project changes. In the North End's Battery Wharf, the
neighborhood's main tactics of challenging the development process, building a broad
force of opposition, and maximizing political influence led to key project changes even
though many of the neighborhood's demands were not met.
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Indeed the tactics used in the case studies led to varying levels of success and reiterate
that there is no one solution or set of ways to ensure neighborhood influence in
effectuating large project changes. However, it is possible to identify tactics that are more
likely to be successful according to an intended goal. In particular, tactics that aimed to
both strengthen neighborhood unity and secure institutional support for the neighborhood
were more effective in influencing project changes than tactics that focus on
neighborhood unity alone or seek only to gain institutional support. For example,
BWWG's creation and institution of its own review process was a unifying tactic that
involved elected officials in building a public awareness campaign which led to BRA
support. FLP, however, attempted to gain BRA support but could not bridge
neighborhood divisions and, in the end, only minimal on-site project changes occurred.
In addition to utilizing tactics that unite and garner institutional support, incorporating
project abutters into a neighborhood strategy can be an effective tactic in itself or
complement other tactics by increasing the neighborhood's influence. For instance,
abutters played a crucial role in setting the final terms of the Liberty Place project after a
host of other tactics were used. Meanwhile, project abutters in the South End essentially
represented the neighborhood and proved to be the most successful case study in this
thesis. The abutters of Battery Wharf, Burroughs Wharf, played a notable role in
influencing design changes to improve site access and alleviate traffic, and eliminate the
supermarket.
In sum, the Liberty Place, Dover Residences, and Battery Wharf cases bring out tactical
considerations that neighborhoods should bear in mind when proceeding with a strategy
against a development. The high level of unity in and institutional support extended to
ODNA in Dover Residences highlight that the thrust of a neighborhood's effort to
effectuate large project changes must be channeled through its advisory power to
convince and persuade the BRA and developer. The Battery Wharf case exemplifies the
sensitivity with which neighborhood unity can affect institutional support. BRA director
O'Brien actively worked to advance BWWG's demands at the beginning. However,
when BWWG allies lannella and Travaglini became supporters of the Battery Wharf
project, BRA support for BWWG diminished significantly. Liberty Place, in contrast,
illustrates how a divided neighborhood can prevent the city and developer from
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addressing the collective interests of the neighborhood. That is, although FLP's tactics
eventually led to gaining some level of institutional support in implementing systemic
changes to increase resident influence in future Chinatown developments, the group
experienced limited success in effectuating changes to the project itself.
The Process
The experiences of Chinatown, the South End, and the North End not only bring out the
inconsistencies with which the BRA administers the "process", but also emphasize the
influence that the BRA can exert in affecting project approval. In particular, the outcome
and level of institutional support extended to Dover Residences compared to the other
two cases indicate that different projects get different treatment by the city. Whereas
negotiation of project changes occurred during the public review process in Liberty Place
and Battery Wharf, ODNA secured core project changes prior to the process. While this
observation does not suggest that the BRA intends to treat developers and neighborhood
groups differently, only that it in fact occurs.
Given that not all neighborhoods enter the development process with either equal level of
institutional support or equal resources, then subjecting all neighborhoods to a uniform
public process such as Article 80 allows certain neighborhoods to have greater influence
in affecting a project than others. For ODNA, Article 80 was a formal forum in which the
group could fine-tune project changes to address their concerns. In great contrast, the
process was primarily used to convince and persuade the BRA and developers to address
FLP and BWWG concerns. In addition, divisions in the Chinatown neighborhood
surfaced and intensified during the Liberty Place process. In this regard, it is unfair to
expect every neighborhood to undergo one standard public process without factoring
unique neighborhood conditions.
Furthermore, while the BRA attempted to mediate conflicts between the neighborhood
and developer across the three neighborhoods, the mediation approach differed. While
Lathrop pushed for immediate resolutions agreeable to both the developer and
neighborhood when conflicts arose, BRA director O'Brien focused his efforts on
encouraging the developer to make specific changes to ensure project approval. In the
case with Liberty Place, the BRA created working sessions with the goal to educate the
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neighborhood about the constraints of large-scale development in Chinatown and as a
mechanism to resolve neighborhood differences. In all three cases, BRA intervention led
to dissatisfied developers and neighborhoods alike. While the neighborhoods were
frustrated by the BRA's inability to adequately address neighborhood concerns, the
developers regarded the BRA as a neighborhood advocate that is unwilling to assert its
pro-development tendencies.
Although the BRA instituted IAGs as one measure to provide equal access to sufficient
mitigation and benefits to all neighborhoods, it does not go far enough in alleviating the
mutual dissatisfaction of developers and neighborhoods or in equalizing the treatment of
neighborhoods on development issues. Instead, the incorporation of IAGs in the
"process" has led to mixed results. Of the three cases examined, only Dover Residences
involved an IAG. Personal communication with the developer and members of ODNA
reveals that the IAG played a minimal role in the process and approved the agreement
with little discussion. The core negotiation and terms of mitigation were resolved by the
developer and ODNA.
The case studies indicate that neighborhoods are generally concerned with minimizing
the adverse impacts that a project can generate. However, it has been established that not
all neighborhoods have equal resources or capacity to fully participate in the process.
While it would be optimal if the BRA could institute the following suggestions to
diminish the disparate treatment of projects and neighborhood groups, I recognize that it
is highly unlikely. Therefore recommendations to strengthen neighborhood influence in a
large project development process also have been formulated for Boston neighborhoods
as they continue to tackle large projects being proposed in their boundaries.
Suggestions for the BRA
e Clarify the intent and limitations of the "process" so that neighborhoods
understand which changes are more likely to occur and what outcomes to expect.
e Clarify that the neighborhoods possess only an advisory role in the process and
their efforts should be channeled through their advisory power.
e Provide adequate translation resources to ensure equal participation in the process.
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" Re-examine and centralize the BRA's organization of and request for public
documents to ensure equal public access, particularly for non-English speakers.
* Redefine who should represent the neighborhood in development and assess
whether neighborhood councils adequately fulfill the new definition.
* Propose that neighborhoods resolve their differences rather than have the BRA
attempt to mediate the conflicts.
Recommendations for Boston neighborhoods
1. Build institutional allies. Since it has been established that the BRA and mayor have
critical roles in the process, it would be to a neighborhood's advantage to build allies
at the city level. This could range from getting the mayor personally involved in a
particular development issue that pertains to the neighborhood to developing
relationships with members of the Zoning Board of Appeals, Zoning Commission, or
even inspectional services (which issue the necessary building permits for project
construction). Other areas of potential ally-building include the Boston Civic Design
Commission, the BRA board, and BRA staff.
2. Support and encourage neighborhood members or allies who are appointed to or
are seeking a position at the city. This recommendation draws from the success of
the Lower Washington Street Task Force in building strong ties with the mayor and
BRA. Getting even one neighborhood ally to sit on a mayor-appointed commission
such as the Boston Civic Design Commission puts the ally in a strategic position to
try and build support from within the commission.
3. Institute a neighborhood liaison position at the BRA. Given that the BRA position
presented to Lathrop was unique and does not occur with every neighborhood
planning initiative, neighborhoods can collectively use the case to push the city to
institute a similar position or policy. That is, the majority of Boston neighborhoods
can organize themselves and demand that the BRA incorporate a neighborhood
liaison position as part of the approval process for large projects. This position would
be filled by someone who comes from the neighborhood and is familiar with its
development history to be. This may level the playing field in bringing some
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neighborhoods closer to building institutional support. The office of neighborhood
services in conjunction with the mayor's office has already established official
neighborhood liaisons who have been present at development-related events.
However, these liaisons are neither necessarily familiar with the development process
nor situated in the BRA and they are not required to be from the neighborhood they
represent.
4. Involve abutters. As stated earlier, abutters can help strengthen the influence that a
neighborhood exerts on project changes and can have legal standing in filing a
lawsuit against a development. Liberty Place and Dover Residences attest to the
varying impacts that abutters can have on a project. Naturally abutters have a vested
interest in the development and it is better to have abutters standing on the same side
than on opposite sides of a project.
5. Bridge internal divisions instead of relying on the BRA to mediate the conflicts.
As discussed earlier, the mediation efforts of the BRA have generally resulted in
frustration and discontent between neighborhood groups and developers. Therefore, it
is to a neighborhood's advantage to resolve its own divisions or demand from the
BRA or developer an outside mediator that works independent of the BRA to help the
neighborhood work out its differences. In addition, Liberty Place illustrates how the
developer and/or city can further divide neighborhood interests by offering mitigation
to a specific neighborhood group. This reiterates that resolving neighborhood
differences and negotiating the terms of a project as a collective body will likely lead
to better outcomes than looking to the BRA.
6. Formulate demands into design changes and mitigation, when possible. The case
studies indicate that design changes and mitigation can be more easily secured than
use, dimensional or affordable housing modifications. However, this approach should
be carefully executed. Allowing repeated violations of zoning and/or any other
regulations could send a message to developers that approval of a large project is
dependent on appropriate mitigation and design changes.
7. Work with developers, when possible. Depending on the deviation between a
project proposal and the neighborhoods concerns, a neighborhood can initiate contact
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with the developer to determine a more suitable project. In all three cases, the
developers agreed that the final project design improved as a result of neighborhood
input. However, this approach may be difficult if the terms of a project proposal
deviate significantly from zoning and other regulations and the neighborhood seeks a
project that complies with the regulations.
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Appendix A - Project Timelines
Liberty Place Timeline
June 1999 Kevin Fitzgerald of 1025 Hancock Street, Inc. submits to the BRA a
Project Notification Form for Liberty Place.
July 1999 A public meeting was held in Chinatown. Fitzgerald introduced the Liberty
Plaza project, a mixed use office, retail, and hotel complex.
January 2001 Fitzgerald submits a Notice of Project Change (NPC) and renames the
project Liberty Place. Fitzgerald has partnered with Charles E. Smith
Residential. The project primarily consists of rental housing. The scale of
the project is comparable to previous proposal.
July 2001 Fight Liberty Place (FLP) is created and a public education campaign is
launched to increase awareness of the project both inside and outside the
neighborhood.
December 2001 The Draft Project Impact Report (DPIR) for Liberty Place is submitted to
the BRA.
January 2002 Presentations and updates of the project are made at two publicly
advertised meetings, the monthly Chinatown Neighborhood Council
(CNC) and the Park Plaza Citizens Advisory Council (PPCAC) meetings.
March 2002 Public comment period for DPIR ends. The developer and city received a
high volume of comments from both those who oppose and support the
project.
FLP undertakes Operation CAR JAM.
April 2002 The BRA initiates Liberty Place Focus Group meetings over the next 9
weeks.
June 2002 A publicly advertised community meeting is held. The BRA presents the
work of the Focus Group meetings. A total of six 2-hour working sessions
occurred.
FLP undertakes ACT OUT street theatre protest.
The CNC unanimously vote to support Liberty Place.
July 2002 Members of BRA staff request that the Director issue a Preliminary
Adequacy Determination waiving further review under Article 80.
August 2002 Referendum is held in Chinatown on the 2nd and 3rd. A total of 923
residents voted. By a 3 to 1 ratio, the residents opposed Liberty Place.
The zoning board of appeals (ZBA) unanimously vote for variances to
Liberty Place project on the 6th
September 2002 Zoning Board of Appeal written decision filed for Liberty Place.
Abutters Simon So and the Chinese Progressive Association file a lawsuit
against zoning decisions.
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Dover Residences Timeline
January 2001
February 2001
March 2001
November 2001
February 2002
April 2002
June 2002
August 2002
September 2002
October 2002
November 2002
February 2003
Atlas begins discussion with the city and neighborhood representatives
of the Dover Residences site.
Atlas discusses Dover Residences with Old Dover Neighborhood
Association (ODNA) representatives on the 23rd.
Follow up discussion with ODNA on the 21st.
Atlas makes initial presentation of development project at ODNA
meeting.
Developer starts to meet regularly with ODNA, abutters, and concerned
residents to improve project plan. The meetings continue for the rest of
the year.
Atlas requests a no-vote from Old Dover Neighborhood Association on
the 2 8t. At the meeting the members were to take an official vote on the
project.
Atlas and BRA presents new project plan to ODNA representatives on
the 6 th and 1 2th
Atlas submits Project Notification Form (PNF) to BRA on the 9 th..
PNF public meeting occurs on the 1 8 th.
Atlas corresponds with ODNA.
Atlas submits Supplemental Info to PNF to BRA.
Conversations with ODNA and abutters continue into late July.
BRA board unanimously voted to authorize issuance of a Scoping
Determination Waiving Further Review in Article 80 process.
BRA issues Scoping Determination Waiving Further Review. Boston
Zoning Commission designates Project Site as a "U" District (urban
renewal district).
Article 80 review is completed.
Additional parcels needed to realize project is finalized by the BRA
through an Amended and Restated Land Disposition Agreement (LDA).
A cooperation agreement was signed between Atlas and the BRA on the
1 3
th
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Battery Wharf Timeline
December 1996
November 1997
December 1997
January 1998
February 1998
May 1998
March 1999
March 30, 2000
August 2000
September 2001
August 2003
Raymond submits Project Notification Form (PNF) for Battery Wharf.
Battery Wharf introduced at North End Community meeting. Hundreds
were in attendance. Raymond took names of people interested in joining
working group. The Battery Wharf Development Working Group
(BWWG) was created.
BWWG continues to organize, collect information, and inform
neighborhood.
Raymond submits Draft Project Impact Report (DPIR) without notifying
working group. Neighborhood learns of DPIR on the 23r at a community
meeting and weeks after its submission.
Comment letters on DPIR were due on the 9 th
MEPA decided that the Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) had
sufficient information and a Final Environmental Impact Report (FEIR)
was uncecessary.
A community meeting was held in which MEPA representative Lyman
was present on the 23d.
Over 50 personal letters submitted to MEPA. BWWG submits 14-page
comment letter late in the month.
BWWG distributes fact sheets and a guide to writing and calling elected
officials to further encourage residents to write letters and make phone-
calls opposing the project.
A public meeting was held on the 18h
Many people testified at the BRA board meeting in which the board
unanimously voted for approval of the project on the 2 1 ".
BRA issues Preliminary Adequacy Determination Waiving Further
Review.
Raymond and the City of Boston sign a cooperation agreement outlining
mitigation and community benefits resulting from the project.
Raymond sells entire site and project to Harold Theran of Development
Management Corporation.
Theran submits Notice of Minor Modifications to Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP).
Awaiting financing to be in place to begin construction of site.
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Appendix B - Persons Interviewed
BRA Staff
Maria Faria, Dick Garver, Sue Kim, Randi Lathrop, and David Hanifin.
Neighborhood Representatives
Chinatown
Richard Chin, Chinatown Neighborhood Council and Wang YMCA; Jeremy Liu, Asian
Community Development Corporation; David Moy, Boston Chinatown Neighborhood
Center and The Chinatown Coalition; Marie Moy, Chinatown Resident Association.
South End
Liz Cahill, Old Dover Neighborhood Association and Laconia Lofts Trustee; Sheila
Grove, Washington Street Gateway Main Streets; Robert Wells, Old Dover
Neighborhood Association and Columbia/City Lights resident.
North End
Fran Clay, Battery Wharf Working Group and Burroughs Wharf Trustee; Stephanie
Gabbarelli, North End/Waterfront Neighborhood Council; Dave Kubiak, Battery Wharf
Working Group.
Developers
John Connolly, Sawyer Enterprises, Loews Hotel; Demetrios Dasco, Atlas Investment
Group, Dover Residences; Jim English, Raymond Properties, Battery Wharf; Kevin F.
Fitzgerald, 1025 Hancock, Incorporated, Liberty Place; Harold Theran, Development
Management Corporation, Battery Wharf; Nick Iselin, Intercontinental, 226 Causeway;
Bob Walsh, RF Walsh, Biosquare.
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Appendix C - Public Documents Reviewed
Article 80 Reports and Notification Forms
Thesis Case Studies
1. Project Notification Form (PNF) for Battery Wharf, April 1996.
2. Draft Project Impact Report (DPIR) for Battery Wharf, 7 January 1998.
3. Project Notification Form (PNF) for Dover Residences, 9 April 2002.
4. Project Notification Form (PNF) for Liberty Plaza, 15 June 1999.
5. Notice of Project Change (NPC) for Liberty Place, 25 January 2001.
6. Draft Project Impact Report (DPIR) for Liberty Place, 7 December 2001.
Notification Form
Notification Form
Notification Form
Notification Form
Notification Form
Notification Form
Notification Form
Notification Form
Notification Form
Notification Form
Notification Form
Notification Form
Notification Form
Notification Form
Notification Form
for 131 Dartmouth, 2 March 1998.
for Biosquare, 24 August 1999.
for Colonnade Residences, 16 February 1996.
for Columbus Center, 9 March 2001.
for Commonwealth Center, 2 September 1997.
for Davenport Commons, 11 January 1999.
for Harrison Commons, December 2002.
for Kensington Place, 10 December 2001.
for Laconia Lofts, 4 March 1997.
for Loews Hotel, 13 December 1999.
for Medical Services Center, March 1999.
for Parcel 8/BCA, 6 May 1998.
for Parcel C, 1 May 2001.
for Rollins Square, 25 February 2000.
for Wilkes Passage, 6 October 1999.
Various Letters between Neighborhood Representatives and
Development-related Government Agencies*
1. Letter from BWWG to BRA and EOEA in late February 1998.
2. Various public comment letters regarding Battery Wharf to Trudy Coxe (Secretary,
Executive Office of Environmental Affairs) in February 1998.
3. Letter from Raymond Properties to BRA Director O'Brien on April 21, 1998.
4. Letter from Barry Liner (Chairperson of Board of Trustees of Burroughs Wharf) to
BRA on April 22, 1998.
5. Letter from Richard Iannella to BRA on April 23, 1998.
6. Letter from Senator Traviglini to BRA on May 7, 1998.
7. Letter from NEWRA to James English of Raymond Properties on May 18, 1998.
8. Letter from Phyllis Rugnetta of NEWRA to Jan Reitsma (Deputy Secretary of the
EOEA) on December 3, 1998.
9. Letter from Theran's legal representation to DEP waterways regulation program on
September 18, 2001.
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Other
1. Project
2. Project
3. Project
4. Project
5. Project
6. Project
7. Project
8. Project
9. Project
10. Project
11. Project
12. Project
13. Project
14. Project
15. Project
10. Letter from CPC to BRA on February 15, 2002.
11. Letter from Alternatives for Community and Environment (ACE) to BRA on
February 19, 2002.
12. Letter from Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS) to BRA on February 20, 2002.
13. Various public comment letters regarding Liberty Place to the BRA in February 2002.
14. Letter cosigned by FLP organizers to BRA director Mark Maloney on March 26,
2002.
15. Letter from BRA director Mark Maloney to FLP organizers on April 5, 2002.
16. Letter from BRA director Mark Maloney to Andrew Leong of Campaign to Protect
Chinatown on April 10, 2002.
17. Letter from CPC to BRA Director Mark Maloney on April 15, 2002.
18. Letter from Liz Cahill to Maria Faria on May 22, 2002.
19. Letter from Robert A. Wells to Maria Faria of the BRA on May 23, 2002.
20. Various public comment letters regarding Dover Residences to the BRA in Spring
2002.
21. Letter from Herb Fremin of Washington Street Gateway to the BRA on July 29, 2002.
22. Letter from Washington Street Gateway to BRA director Mark Maloney on July 8,
2002.
*Research not limited to the letters listed.
BRA Board Memorandums and Cooperation Agreements
1. BRA Board Memorandum of May 21, 1998 Battery Wharf
2. Cooperation Agreement of March 30, 2000 Battery Wharf
3. BRA Board Memorandum of August 1, 2002, Dover Residences
4. Cooperation Agreement of February 13, 2003, Dover Residences
5. BRA Board Memorandum of August 1, 2002, Liberty Place
Other
1. "Battery Wharf Project - A Neighborhood Call to Action: Guide to Writing and
Calling Elected Officials" by the Battery Wharf Working Group, March 1998.
2. "Liberty Place Fact Sheet" by the Campaign to Protect Chinatown, Fall 2001.
3. Notice of Decision, City of Boston Board of Appeal, BZC-22321 Permit #3708/01,
11 September 2002.
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